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Mandatory Fee Arbitration Under New 
York’s Matrimonial Rules 
By Professor Lester Brickman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, public dissatisfaction with lawyers has mounted ceaselessly. A significant 
portion of that dissatisfaction is attributable to concerns about lawyers’ integrity and 
fees.[1] Indeed, “[n]o single issue between lawyer and client arises more frequently or generates 
more public resentment than fee problems.”[2] Despite the near ubiquity of fee disputes, client 
complaints to disciplinary agencies about excessive fees are almost always rejected because most 
disciplinary boards do not accept jurisdiction over claims of excessive fees.[3] 
To deal with this failure of the disciplinary system[4] and mounting public criticism of the bar, 
many states have instituted fee arbitration programs;[5] twelve states, including New York in the 
area of matrimonial law,[6] have instituted mandatory fee arbitration programs[7]empowering 
clients (and sometimes lawyers as well) to compel their attorneys to arbitrate fee disputes. 
In July 1992, the Administrative Board of New York State, in reaction to the public outcry 
generated by a report issued by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs detailing 
severe lawyer abuse of matrimonial clients, especially the non-monied spouse in matrimonial 
cases,[8] established a Committee to Examine Lawyer Conduct in Matrimonial Action. This 
Committee set out to study the role of attorneys in matrimonial actions in order to “lead to 
recommendations that will have a significant impact on the ultimate ability of the court system to 
improve the providing of a fair and effective tribunal for the hearing of matrimonial actions. . . 
“[9] One of the Committee’s recommendations was to give clients the right to elect to arbitrate 
attorney fee disputes in domestic relations cases. This recommendation was premised on the 
findings that: (1) fee arbitration resulted in the “expeditious and cost-effective resolution of a 
potentially protracted dispute, and is, therefore, generally favored by litigants and attorneys;” and 
(2) “[a]ttorneys who successfully participate in mandatory fee arbitration have established a 
practice of frequent billing, detailed fee statements, and better communication with their 
client.”[10] In 1993, the Appellate Divisions of the New York State Supreme Court adopted new 
rules for attorney conduct in domestic relations matters in response to the Committee’s 
proposals. Among those rules was a directive to the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts to 
establish and operate a fee arbitration program for attorney-client fee disputes in domestic 
relations matters.[11] 
Since the inception of New York’s program, there have been several reports issued on its 
operation. In 1995, a committee formed by the courts conducted a survey of the Bar and issued a 
report.[12] Later that year, an article was published surveying matrimonial fee arbitration 
in Suffolk County, New York.[13] In 1996, an extensive report was published surveying the 
results of the fee arbitration program and finding that usage of the program in 1996 had increased 
substantially.[14] Substantively, the report indicated that clients had won reductions in 70% of 
the cases arbitrated and that attorneys received, on average, 72% of the total amount in 
dispute.[15] Finally, the report noted that the processes of selection and training of arbitrators 
required improvement.[16] 
II. NEW YORK’S MANDATORY FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 
          All attorneys who undertake to represent a client in New York in a matrimonial matter, 
that is, one involving divorce, separation, annulment, custody, visitation, maintenance, child 
support, or alimony, or to enforce or modify a judgment or order in connection with such 
matters, are governed by special rules of court.[17] This article will discuss several of these rules 
as well as principles to guide arbitrators engaged in arbitration of matrimonial fee disputes. 
A. What Documents Must a Matrimonial Attorney Provide to a Client Prior to Representation? 
          Section 1400.3 of the court rules, setting forth the “Procedure For Attorneys in Domestic 
Relations Matters,” (see Appendix C) requires that an attorney “who undertakes to represent a 
party and enters into an arrangement for, charges or collects any fee from a client shall execute a 
written agreement with the client setting forth in plain language the terms of compensation and 
the nature of services to be rendered . . . signed by both client and attorney. . .”[18] Additionally, 
§ 1400.2 requires that a prospective client be furnished with a Statement of Client’s Rights and 
Responsibilities (see Appendix B) at the initial conference or first consultation and prior to the 
signing of a written retainer agreement.[19] 
B. Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities 
          At the initial meeting between the lawyer and the prospective matrimonial client, and prior 
to the signing of a written agreement, the attorney must provide the prospective client with a 
Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities, as prescribed by the Appellate Divisions of the 
Supreme Court,[20] and obtain a signed acknowledgment or receipt from the prospective or 
actual client. If the attorney has failed to provide the requisite statement at the initial conference 
or first consultation and prior to the signing of a written retainer agreement, then the attorney is 
not entitled to any fee, irrespective of any work done or results obtained.[21] Similarly, if the 
client has already paid a fee and the attorney has failed to provide the requisite statements, and 
this failure would have precluded the attorney from seeking a fee, the client should be able to 
recoup any fees paid.[22] 
Even if the initial meeting between a matrimonial attorney and the prospective or actual client is 
solely for the purpose of a consultation and not to represent the client in a matrimonial matter, 
the attorney is nonetheless required to give that prospective or actual client a copy of the 
Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities.[23] 
C. The Written Retainer Agreement 
          A lawyer who agrees to be hired in a matrimonial matter must enter into a written retainer 
agreement, signed by both the lawyer and the client, which sets forth in plain language the 
purpose of the representation and the details of the fee arrangement.[24] If there is an action filed 
in the Supreme Court, then a copy of the signed retainer agreement must be filed with the court 
(along with the statement of net worth).[25] In the event the attorney has not timely filed a copy 
of the signed retainer agreement with the court, as required, along with the statement of his or 
her client’s net worth, then the attorney is not entitled to a fee.[26] 
The required contents of the written retainer agreement are set forth in detail in §1400.3 and are 
included in Appendix A. If an attorney fails to enter into a written retainer agreement with a 
client, then irrespective of the amount of work the attorney has performed or the results obtained, 
the attorney is not entitled to a fee.[27] However, if there was a written and signed retainer 
agreement, which did not meet the precise requirements of §1400.3, as set out in Appendix A, 
the attorney may nonetheless may be entitled to a fee, provided she substantially complied with 
the Matrimonial Rules requirements and the client waived his right to arbitration of the fee 
dispute.[28] 
If the client has already paid a fee, then the attorney’s failure to provide the requisite statements 
should entitle the client to recoupment.[29] However, at least one court[30] has held that “where 
a retainer agreement fails to comply with the provisions of the matrimonial rules, the court need 
not return fees properly earned by an attorney” and that the cases holding that failure to comply 
with the requirements of the Matrimonial Rules precluding a lawyer from collecting fees, are not 
authority for the proposition that the client in such a case may obtain disgorgement of any fees 
already paid.[31] Markard v. Markard is properly limited to its facts: namely, that the violation 
of the Matrimonial Rules (a provision in the retainer agreement waiving itemized billing in 
contravention of the required terms of the retainer agreement, see Appendix A, ¶ 9, and of the 
Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities) was not of sufficient magnitude as to invoke 
the forfeiture outcome; that the client discharged the lawyer without legal cause and therefore 
was obligated to pay the lawyer quantum meruit for the work done up to discharge (which was 
determined to be the substantial portion of the $10,000 retainer fee); and that had the client 
sought arbitration of the fee instead of simply demanding the disgorgement of the fee already 
paid, then the amount of the fee already paid would have been a proper subject of the arbitration. 
To the extent that Markard is to be read as distinguishing between fees already paid and fees to 
be paid for purposes of protecting client’s correlative rights under the Matrimonial Rules, it 
should be rejected as inconsistent with the public policy articulated by the New York Court of 
Appeals in In re Cooperman.[32] In that case, the Court of Appeals declared that the policy 
articulated in Martin v. Camp,[33] that a client could discharge an attorney at any time without 
cause and without penalty, would apply both to fees yet to be collected as well as to fees already 
collected and denominated as nonrefundable.[34] 
It is incumbent on the arbitrator to make certain that these court rules are adhered to – whether or 
not the client seeking arbitration has raised the issue. 
If a prospective client hires a matrimonial attorney prior to the filing of a matrimonial claim, 
action, or proceeding, then the attorney must comply with the Matrimonial Rules.[35]However, 
if the retention is for the sole purpose of consulting with that attorney and not for the purpose – 
at that time – of hiring the attorney to represent the client in a matrimonial matter, then the 
charging of a consultation fee alone does not trigger the requirement that a signed retainer 
agreement must have been first obtained.[36] Even though there is no requirement that the fee 
agreement for the consultation be in writing, it is the better practice for the attorney to enter into 
a written retainer agreement even if the sole purpose of the meeting is for consultation. 
Moreover, in the event that there is a fee dispute regarding such a consultation and that dispute is 
included in the issues presented in a matrimonial arbitration, the attorney would have the burden 
of establishing that an agreement was entered into for a consultation as well as for the amount of 
the fee claimed. If the client claims, and the attorney denies, that the attorney agreed to provide a 
consultation without fee and there is neither conclusive documentary evidence nor persuasive 
demeanor evidence, then the failure of the attorney to meet the requisite burden of proof may be 
a basis for denial of the attorney’s claim for a consultation fee. 
If the initial meeting(s) are for consultation only, but the relationship changes to one of 
representation, then the attorney must enter a written retainer agreement with the client as soon 
as the change occurs. 
D. Notice of Right to Fee Arbitration 
          In the event of a fee dispute between a matrimonial attorney and client, the client has the 
right to seek binding arbitration of the dispute provided that the amount in dispute – whether or 
not the attorney has already been paid – is not in excess of $100,000.[37] It is the attorney’s duty 
to provide the client with written notice that the client may submit the dispute to 
arbitration.[38] If an attorney fails to give the client such notice, the client is entitled to dismissal 
of an action brought by the attorney to recover a fee.[39] Denial of fees sought in a suit against 
the client for nonpayment on the basis of failure to give notice of the right to arbitrate, is 
consistent with the intent of the Matrimonial Rules to empower clients to seek fee 
arbitration.[40] If the dispute is about fees already paid and the attorney did not give the client 
notice of the right to arbitrate, then it does not follow – as it does in the cases where the attorney 
has failed to provide the client with a copy of a Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities 
or of the retainer agreement[41] – that the attorney should have to disgorge the fee. Since there 
(presumably) was no fee dispute when the advance fee payment was made, the client’s rights 
under the Matrimonial Rules have not been violated. However, once the client disputes the 
attorney’s fee as to fees already paid, the attorney at that point should be required to notify the 
client of the right to arbitrate the dispute. It is unclear whether failure to notify the client at that 
point of his right to arbitrate should result in per se disgorgement. However, it is reasonably clear 
under the Matrimonial Rules that if some or all of the fee is paid in advance and, after services 
are rendered, the charges against that advance fee are disputed, then the fee dispute is subject to 
arbitration under the Matrimonial Rules.[42] 
Upon receipt of notice of the right to seek fee arbitration, the client then has 30 days to file the 
request for arbitration; if the request is not filed within the 30-day period, the attorney may 
commence an action to recover the fee and the client no longer has the right to request fee 
arbitration.[43] The lawyer, upon written consent from the client to submit the dispute to 
arbitration, may also initiate arbitration.[44] 
While the consequences of failure to abide by the Matrimonial Rules by providing a client with: 
(1) a Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities; (2) a written retainer agreement; or (3) a 
notice of the right to fee arbitration, have been discussed and spelled out, the Rules are silent 
about how these requirements mesh with lawyers’ rights to assert retaining and charging liens. 
E. Retaining and Charging Liens[45] 
At common law, two kinds of liens are available to an attorney to aid in collection of his fee. 
First, a general possessory lien, also known as a retaining lien or a general lien, functions as a 
form of security for an attorney’s fees and affords an attorney the right to retain client papers and 
property in the attorney’s possession until the client has satisfied all balances owed to the 
attorney.[46] Second, a charging lien can be imposed by an attorney upon the proceeds of a 
judgment realized by a client through the efforts of such attorney.[47]While the legislature has 
codified and expanded the charging lien under Sections 475 and 475-a of the Judiciary 
Law,[48] the retaining lien is still governed by common law rules.[49] 
Generally, an attorney has a common law retaining lien upon papers, money,[50]and other client 
property that comes into the attorney’s hands during the course of his professional 
employment.[51] The attorney may withhold the property until the lien is satisfied or adequately 
secured.[52] If the client seeks the attached property and does not agree with the attorney’s 
valuation of the lien, the client may petition the court for an order to turn over the property, at 
which time the attorney is entitled to a summary determination fixing the value of his 
services.[53] 
New York courts, in the exercise of their authority to define and effectuate the fiduciary 
obligation owed by an attorney to a client, have declined to allow an attorney to enforce a 
retaining lien when a client would be unfairly prejudiced by the attorney’s continued retention of 
client property.[54] In matrimonial decisions involving exigent circumstances (usually client 
indigence and necessity of papers to preparation or continuation of the representation), the courts 
have declined to enforce retaining liens in appropriate circumstances.[55] 
Retaining and charging liens are not directly germane to fee arbitration under the Matrimonial 
Rules; arbitrators have no authority to rule on the validity of either lien – the issue is one 
reserved to the courts. However, several of the judicial decisions on the liens’ validity in 
particular cases directly address the scope and purposes of the Matrimonial Rules, and are 
therefore of interest to matrimonial fee arbitrators. In particular, a series of contradictory rulings 
address whether a matrimonial attorney can invoke a common law retaining lien if the attorney 
has failed to provide the client with written notice of the right to arbitrate the fee. Several courts 
have held that DR2-106(e) of New York Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that 
in domestic relations matters, “a lawyer shall resolve fee disputes by arbitration at the election of 
the client,”[56] is to be interpreted to abrogate the attorney’s right to impose a retaining or 
charging lien if she failed to provide the client with written notice of the right to arbitrate the 
fee.[57] However, other courts focusing on the fact that the Matrimonial Rules, as initially 
drafted, contained a provision abrogating the common law retaining lien, but noting that that 
provision was deleted from the Rules due to opposition from the matrimonial bar, have held that 
there is no basis for concluding that the Rules abrogate the retaining lien by implication.[58] 
Both sets of rulings are based upon sound reasoning. Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals 
will have to resolve the issues of (1) whether an attorney can be granted a charging lien if the 
attorney has failed to comply with provisions of the Matrimonial Rules;[59]and (2) whether an 
attorney can invoke a common law retaining lien so as to effectively compel a client who has 
retained a new attorney, and who requires immediate access to his file in order to proceed, to pay 
the discharged attorney’s fee, and thereby, essentially invalidate the client’s right to invoke the 
arbitration procedures created by the Matrimonial Rules.[60] 
F. Rules Regulating Types of Fees and Security Interests in Matrimonial Cases 
          Lawyers are prohibited from charging a contingent fee in matrimonial matters, that is, a 
fee which is a percentage of, or otherwise determined by, the amount of maintenance, support, 
equitable distribution, or property awarded.[61] 
All lawyers, but in particular, matrimonial lawyers, are prohibited from charging nonrefundable 
retainers. Nonrefundable retainers are fees paid in advance to secure a lawyer’s commitment to 
provide matrimonial services or for specific matrimonial services to be rendered, which the 
lawyer is to keep even if the client thereafter terminates the lawyer’s services before the fee has 
been fully earned.[62] A client may terminate a lawyer for any reason – what is known in the law 
as “without cause”[63] – at any time during the representation. If the client does so, he is 
obligated to pay the lawyer the reasonable value of the services rendered to that point. However, 
the client is not required to pay the lawyer any damages for breach of contract or for fees that the 
lawyer expected to earn but which were denied to the lawyer because of the termination.[64] 
A matrimonial lawyer may not obtain a confession of judgment or promissory note, take a lien 
on real property, or otherwise obtain a security interest to secure his or her fee unless: (1) the 
retainer agreement provides that a security interest may be sought; (2) notice of an application 
for a security interest has been given to the other spouse; and (3) the court grants approval for the 
security interest after submission of an application for counsel fees.[65] 
III. CONDUCT OF THE ARBITRATION 
A. Conduct of a Matrimonial Fee Arbitration 
          After the attorney, who has the burden of proof,[66] has presented his case, then the client 
can present his or her views about the services rendered and the time that the attorney claimed to 
have devoted to the matter.[67] Each side may call witnesses in support of their 
presentation,[68] who are subject to cross-examination.[69] The client has the right to present the 
final argument.[70] Arbitrators are not required to apply formal rules of evidence and have the 
right to issue subpoenas and administer oaths.[71] 
B. Burden of Proof 
          It is a general proposition of law that “[a]n attorney has the burden of showing that a fee 
contract is fair, reasonable and fully known and understood by the client.”[72] “Even in the 
absence of fraud or undue influence, an agreement to pay a legal fee may be invalid if it appears 
that the attorney got the better of the bargain, unless [the attorney] can show that the client was 
fully aware of the consequences and that there was no exploitation of the client’s confidence by 
the attorney.”[73] The rules for conduct of matrimonial fee arbitration expressly state that the 
attorney has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence[74] that the fee is 
reasonable.[75] In order to meet this burden, the attorney must present documentation of the 
work performed and the billing history.[76] 
Simply conforming to the matrimonial rule requirements, so that the fee arrangement is detailed 
in plain language and does not contain a nonrefundable fee clause, does not establish that the fee 
is reasonable.[77] If the lawyer meets his or her initial burden of proof with respect to the unpaid 
fee by presenting documentation establishing: (1) the number of hours devoted to the 
representation; (2) that the written retainer agreement sets forth an hourly rate; and (3) further 
demonstrates that she has conformed to the requirements of the Matrimonial Rules,[78] then the 
burden shifts to the client. He can then seek to demonstrate that either the hourly rate or the 
number of hours listed was excessive or that other reasons exist for denying part or all of the fee 
claim, such as a breach of the standards of care or conduct, or of the ethics code. If the arbitrator 
concludes that the evidence is evenly balanced on both sides, then the attorney has not 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that the fee is reasonable. 
C. Effect of Account Stated 
          Frequently, when seeking payment for legal services, lawyers will assert the legal rule of 
an “account stated” in support of the right to a fee that has been evidenced by sending bills for 
those fees to the client. The general rule for enforcement of accounts stated is that where the 
client has not objected to the bills sent by the lawyer, i.e., to the “account,” then the client has no 
defense to the action of the attorney to collect the outstanding fee.[79] The thrust of the “account 
stated” argument in support of a claim for legal services is mitigated in judicial proceedings by a 
competing principle, namely that courts carefully scrutinize lawyer-client fee 
agreements.[80] Moreover, a claim of fraud, mistake, or other equitable consideration, is 
recognized as posing an exception to the account stated rule.[81] 
Since arbitration is by its very nature an equitable proceeding, the assertion by the lawyer of an 
“account stated” is not accorded the same legal status as it would if brought in a court of law. 
Indeed, the matrimonial fee arbitration rules displace the “account stated” rule with regard to 
matrimonial fee arbitration.[82] To hold otherwise would effectively negate the remedial purpose 
that underlies the fee arbitration rules governing domestic relation matters. The fact that the 
lawyer periodically submitted bills for legal services to the client, and the client raised no 
objection to them at the time of receipt, may be taken into account by the arbitrator in assessing 
the validity of the client’s claims that the fee is excessive; but the function of the arbitrator is to 
come to a fair and reasonable determination. It may be that the effect of arguing an “account 
stated” by the attorney in matrimonial fee arbitration is to sustain the lawyer’s initial burden of 
proof; even so, that does not preclude the client from countering with evidence of the 
unreasonableness of the fee.[83] 
D. Reason for Arbitrator’s Decision 
          Whether an arbitrator decides to reduce a disputed legal bill or disbursement, or award the 
attorney the full fee claimed, the arbitrator should include the reasons for doing so in the 
decision. Failure to refer to evidence or other basis in reason for the reduction of a fee or 
disbursement is grounds for overturning the arbitrator’s decision on appeal.[84] The arbitral 
decision will be upheld, however, if the award has evidentiary support and is neither arbitrary 
nor capricious.[85] Accordingly, while recognizing that many matrimonial fee arbitrations under 
the New York rules do not involve large sums,[86] but also recognizing the applicable decisional 
law, the arbitrator should include at least a few sentences in the report setting forth the reasons 
for the decision. 
E. Confidentiality 
          All proceedings under the fee arbitration program are confidential except to the extent 
necessary to take ancillary legal action with respect to a fee matter.[87] If during the course of 
arbitration, an arbitrator who is an attorney hears information leading him to believe that the 
attorney seeking a fee has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, under DR 1-103(a) 
of the Code,[88] the arbitrator-lawyer may then have a duty to report that violation to a court or 
disciplinary agency.[89] Doing so, however, would create a conflict between the confidentiality 
requirement in the Matrimonial Rules and the Code requirement. While it would be best for this 
conflict to be resolved anticipatorily by a ruling from the Appellate Division, until such time, the 
attorney-arbitrator is best advised to seek the advice of the Administrative Judge.[90] 
IV. THE ARBITRATOR’S SUBSTANTIVE TASK 
          In fee arbitration, the beginning point for the arbitrator – after the ground rules have been 
established – is the retainer agreement. Assuming all of the procedural requirements have been 
met and the attorney is seeking a fee that is in accord with the terms of the retainer agreement, is 
there more for the arbitrator to consider? In a word, yes. 
To be sure, an arbitrator may reasonably presume that if there has been a knowing and voluntary 
acceptance of the retainer agreement terms by an informed client, then that establishes the 
presumptive validity of the fee being sought. This presumption, however, is a beginning point for 
further inquiry. Attorney fees are treated differently from prices negotiated in a commercial 
context between a buyer and seller. Attorneys are fiduciaries for their clients, and their fees are 
always subject to the imposition of a reasonableness requirement by courts. To be sure, courts 
will enforce fee agreements to which the client has given informed consent, and the more 
sophisticated the client, the more likely it is a court will find the contract enforceable as written. 
Nonetheless, there are thousands of examples in the judicial literature of courts voiding fee 
agreements for a variety of reasons – mostly based on the attorney’s fiduciary status. 
In the paragraphs that follow, I will attempt to set forth some guiding principles that highlight the 
types of circumstances that have precipitated judicial invalidation of fee agreements or the fees 
generated by those agreements. In doing so, I am not suggesting that arbitrators should start with 
a bias against the enforceability of matrimonial fees. I do, however, seek to point out instances in 
which it is appropriate for arbitrators to carefully examine and, in some instances, look critically 
if not skeptically, at certain matrimonial fees. 
A beginning point for such an approach is to consider what other fee arbitrators have done. 
Unfortunately, little is known about the results of fee arbitration programs – including New 
York’s.[91] What little data we have indicates that matrimonial fee arbitrators have reduced fees 
sought in approximately two thirds of the matters submitted to arbitration and that the average 
award approximates 75 percent of what the attorney was seeking.[92] At best, however, while 
this provides some limited perspective with which to approach the arbitration process,[93] each 
arbitration presents a set of facts that must be evaluated on its own merits. 
A. The Context of the Fee Dispute 
          Some perspective in approaching the arbitrator’s task is important, especially for 
arbitrators without prior experience in matrimonial matters. It is probably often the case that 
client complaints about fees are motivated at least in part by emotional reactions to the break up 
of the marriage and by the litigation process itself. Even a successful outcome from the 
perspective of one of the spouses results in the termination of a marriage and consequent feelings 
of guilt and anger.[94]  The propensity of a client caught up in a divorce proceeding may be to 
use the process to inflict harm on the other spouse. One clear effect of such efforts is an 
increased contentiousness in the litigation process that, in turn, yields higher legal fees. Most 
experienced divorce practitioners seek to minimize these propensities.[95] Some however, 
whether from inexperience or indifference, allow these propensities to manifest in the form of 
protracted litigation. Still, others may actively foment this propensity, using dilatory tactics and 
overlawyering, for self-interested purposes. Moreover, it may be hard to distinguish such 
motivation from “hardball” litigation tactics designed to attain a tactical advantage. 
The arbitrator’s impression of how the lawyer resolved the ubiquitous conflict of interest, 
between the lawyer’s self-interest in generating higher fees and professionally responsible 
behavior that is self-disinterested and fully determined by the client’s needs, will necessarily 
color her determination of whether the fee claimed is reasonable. 
It is also important for the inexperienced arbitrator to have some appreciation of the 
practitioner’s view of the financial realities of divorce representation, where one of the spouses 
earns the bulk of the family’s income. The attorney for the moneyed spouse is usually paid 
monthly or bi-monthly. If a fee dispute arises, then it is either in the context of the aftermath of 
the termination of that lawyer’s services or is limited to the final bill in the representation. In 
either of these scenarios, the amount of the fee in dispute will usually be only a small percentage 
of the total fees billed. 
However, while an attorney representing the non-moneyed spouse[96] will usually require a 
retainer payment to take the case,[97] often the bulk of that attorney’s fee will not be available 
until the conclusion of the case, when the division of the marital property has been settled, or 
ordered, and the property actually distributed.[98] In that circumstance, it was undoubtedly the 
expectation of both lawyer and client that all, or a large portion of the fee, would be paid out of 
the marital proceeds transferred to the non-moneyed spouse. 
Thus, while the attorney for the non-moneyed spouse is sending periodic billing 
statements,[99] there is no expectation of current payment. Indeed, in some realistic sense, 
payment is contingent upon a successful outcome.[100] This may encourage the client to demand 
that no expense be spared in obtaining the fullest possible share of the marital proceeds. An 
attorney who does so may then find that at the conclusion of the representation, the client has a 
more jaundiced view of the value of the attorney’s efforts. 
From the client’s perspective, objecting to a periodic fee statement may be seen to place in 
jeopardy the zealousness of the lawyer’s efforts and may even lead to a termination of services, 
which could adversely affect the client’s strategic position in the litigation. Thus, the muting of 
any fee issues may not reflect acquiescence, let alone consent. 
From the attorney’s perspective, however, after having rendered faithful service for long periods 
of time, often years, in reliance on the client’s silence as constituting assent to the periodic 
billings, the implicit content of the demand for arbitration of the fee – that the fee is 
unreasonably high – is seen as an unfair act. But for the existence of the matrimonial fee 
arbitration program, if the client failed to pay the fee, the attorney could sue, and likely prevail, 
by showing that she had sent periodic bills to the client and the client had not objected.[101] 
The arbitrator must mold these contradictory perspectives into an approach that neither penalizes 
the attorney because she represents the non-monied spouse nor fails to effectuate the objectives 
of the matrimonial fee arbitration program. 
B. Guiding Principles 
          “[A]ttorney-client fee agreements are a matter of special concern to the courts and are 
enforceable and affected by lofty principles different from those applicable to commonplace 
commercial contracts.”[102] Although courts thus arrogate to themselves considerable discretion 
in the determination of disputed attorney fees, arbitrators may be thought to have an even greater 
range of discretion and are not bound to act as would a court when faced with the same 
competing claims. In exercising such discretion, arbitrators and, in particular, fee arbitrators, 
should resolve fee disputes according to principles of justice and equity.[103] 
Moreover, matrimonial fee arbitration is a consumer protection remedy. Accordingly, the 
arbitrator should approach the fee issue from the perspective of what is reasonable. In 
determining how to respond to a client’s claim that the fee is too high, the arbitrator should 
understand that he or she is not necessarily deciding whether the lawyer’s conduct is unethical, 
but whether it has resulted in such an enrichment of the lawyer, at the expense of the client, that 
it offends the decision maker’s sense of fairness and equity.[104] If there is an ethical violation 
or breach of a lawyer’s fiduciary obligation, then that is also to be taken into account by the 
arbitrator in determining a reasonable fee.[105] 
V. DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS OF FEE 
          A fee shall be considered excessive when “after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary 
prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a 
reasonable fee.”[106] What constitutes a reasonable fee will vary from one set of facts to another 
because there is no precise measure of reasonableness.[107] Factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include (but are not limited to): (1) the time and labor 
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform 
the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent or made known to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the 
fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the 
results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by circumstances; (6) the 
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation 
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent.[108] 
If the arbitrator determines that the fee the lawyer is seeking to collect according to the terms of 
the retainer agreement is excessive, then it will be necessary to determine a reasonable fee. This 
calculation may involve: the denial of some of the attorney’s billing; the denial of some expenses 
claimed; a more fundamental determination of a reasonable fee in light of the factors listed 
above;[109] or an essentially identical list of relevant factors set forth in a leading case, as 
follows: Long tradition and just about a universal one in American practice is for the fixation of 
lawyers’ fees to be determined on the following factors: time and labor required, the difficulty of 
the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented; the lawyer’s 
experience, ability and reputation; the amount involved and benefit resulting to the client from 
the services; the customary fee charged by the Bar for similar services; the contingency or 
certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the responsibility involved.[110] 
A. Excessiveness of the Fee: The Hourly Rate 
          It will usually be the case that the hourly rate fee set forth in the retainer agreement will be 
accepted by the arbitrator because it is the product of a voluntary agreement between the lawyer 
and client. However, the arbitrator can determine that the hourly rate quoted was unreasonable 
even though the client agreed to it when he or she signed the retainer agreement. For example, it 
would be plausible to find that a substantial hourly rate, e.g., $300-$500, which some lawyers 
may reasonably charge a wealthy client, would be unreasonable if charged to someone of modest 
means, especially where it would yield an amount equal to a substantial portion of that spouse’s 
reasonable expectation of the amount of marital assets to be awarded.[111] Moreover, even 
though the client necessarily agreed to the hourly rate by signing the retainer agreement, if the 
client was sufficiently unsophisticated and did not realize that they were agreeing to pay top 
dollar and the lawyer did not explain to them that this was so, that may also be a basis for a 
reduction of the hourly rate.[112] 
Finally, if the law firm has differential hourly rates for senior partners, junior partners, 
associates, or contract lawyers, then the arbitrator should examine whether, for example, specific 
services performed by a partner were sufficiently routine or uncomplicated that they could have 
been performed by an associate at a lower hourly billing rate. In that case, the hourly rate fee 
should be reduced to the associate level.[113] 
B. Excessiveness of the Fee: Number of Hours Billed 
          In the typical fee dispute, the number of hours expended is frequently at the core of the 
dispute. The client will typically complain that the amount of time being billed is excessive. 
In addressing this contention, the arbitrator should attempt to obtain an overall assessment of the 
degree of protraction of the litigation. For example, did the opposing party use dilatory tactics or 
otherwise engage in obstructionist behavior?[114] Was the case unduly litigated and, if so, did 
the attorney actively engage in that protraction or were her efforts essentially responsive? If the 
attorney was the aggressor in unduly protracting the litigation, was that sought by the client? If 
so was the client informed of the effect of such a litigation strategy on the attorney’s fee? 
In addition, the arbitrator should seek to determine how much time was billed for communicating 
with the client. Did the client have emotional needs that required the attorney to properly devote 
significant amounts of time to meetings and telephone calls with the client? Did the attorney 
make the client aware that such activities would be reflected in the attorney’s billings and that 
therefore the client needed to balance his needs for information and perhaps “hand-holding” 
against his budgetary constraints? 
After gaining some overall sense of whether the time spent was commensurate with the 
complexity of the litigation, and appropriately attended to the client’s personal needs, the 
arbitrator should then focus on the accuracy of the attorney’s time records. If the attorney has 
failed to maintain adequate time and billing records, that may require the arbitrator to disallow 
some of the claimed charges based upon the inadequacy of the evidence supporting 
them.[115] The fact that the attorney actually expended the time is not necessarily dispositive of 
the fee dispute. If the lawyer is inexperienced and bills for time that most lawyers would not 
have needed to expend because of their basic familiarity with matrimonial law, then it would be 
appropriate to reduce the number of hours for purposes of calculating a reasonable 
fee.[116] Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the time spent was reasonable under the 
circumstances.[117] If a portion of the time was improperly spent, as for example, in the 
bringing of a frivolous motion, then it should be disallowed.[118] While a matrimonial 
attorney’s fee is not dependent upon attainment of a successful outcome for the client, the 
arbitrator should consider the benefit to the client as a result of the services;[119] that is, the 
hours spent must be of value to the client.[120] For example, if a lawyer misses a court 
appearance and, as a consequence, has to appear at a “show cause” hearing necessitated by the 
missed appearance, the time spent doing so does not confer value on the client and should not be 
counted towards the lawyer’s fee. Indeed, by the same reasoning, any time expended by the 
lawyer that would not have had to be expended but for the lawyer’s failure to meet a time 
deadline, file a pleading, etc., is not properly chargeable to the client. 
If the attorney prepared a legal document that was not timely filed or otherwise used on the 
client’s behalf, that raises serious doubt that the client has received the value of that service; fees 
may then be adjusted to be commensurate with the actual value of the services to the client. 
An attorney may bill for travel time, for example, the time required to travel to and from his 
office to a court or deposition provided that there is a “portal to portal” provision in the retainer 
agreement. The absence of such a provision should not necessarily disable the lawyer from 
charging for travel time, but would then be a factor in determining the reasonableness of the 
charges. Even if there is a provision in the retainer agreement providing for billing for travel time 
at the full hourly rate fee set forth, and extensive travel time is involved, e.g., air or train travel or 
extensive driving time, in the event these charges are contested, then the reasonableness of 
charging the full hourly rate for such travel time is appropriately considered. The customary 
practice of lawyers in the community may be considered,[121] but customary practice is “not 
always reasonable.”[122] 
If the lawyer is part of a firm and confers with other lawyers in the firm regarding the subject 
matter of the client’s representation, then it is appropriate to bill for that time. It may or may not 
be appropriate, however, to bill for the time of the other lawyer or lawyers in the firm who were 
consulted. If they have not been working on that matter, and are asked to prepare a document, 
such time is appropriately billed. It is a much closer question, however, if the conference is for 
the purpose of seeking advice or discussing strategy. Billing for such time can easily be an 
abusive practice and any such billings should be carefully scrutinized. 
If the lawyer appears in court at a scheduled time for a hearing but the hearing is delayed, the 
lawyer is entitled to charge for the time spent waiting in court. If during that time, the lawyer 
calls his or her office to check on phone messages or to give instructions regarding scheduling 
other matters, that time, if it is de minimus, can be included as part of “waiting time” and is 
properly chargeable to the client. If, however, the lawyer works on or transacts other clients’ 
business while waiting for the judge, whether by phone or by reading documents, that time is not 
properly chargeable to the matrimonial client (though it may, and probably will, be charged to 
the client on whose behalf that work was done). Charging both the matrimonial client for the 
time spent waiting, and another client for some of that time productively expended for the latter, 
constitutes unethical double billing.[123] 
If the client simply asserts that the lawyer’s total fee is too high and points out, for example, that 
the spouse’s lawyer’s fee was 30 or 50 percent less than his or her own lawyer’s fee and that the 
differential is not mostly accounted for by a difference in the hourly rates, such evidence is not 
dispositive of the claim that the fee is unreasonable; it would, however, be a basis for questioning 
the lawyer as to why his or her total number of hours was substantially greater than that 
expended by opposing counsel and inquiring further into whether the time was spent in ways 
which were productive and valuable to the client. It may be the case, for example, that the 
attorney for the non-monied spouse properly devoted considerable time to the effort of 
identifying the monied spouse’s assets, thereby accounting for a significant differential in the 
amount of hours billed.[124] 
Essentially, the task of the arbitrator is to determine whether the number of hours billed to the 
client was time reasonably spent on behalf of the client or was reasonably necessary to attain the 
client’s objectives and provided the client with commensurate value. Hours that are “excessive, 
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” should not be compensated.[125] 
C. Excessiveness of the Fee: Disproportionateness to the Financial Resources of the Client or to 
the Relief Sought 
          If the combination of the hourly rate and the number of hours actually expended yields a 
fee that is grossly disproportionate to the limited financial resources of the matrimonial litigants 
or to the value of the services, then the fee may be deemed excessive. It may then be reduced to a 
reasonable amount in light of the complexity of the matter and the amount of the marital 
assets.[126] However, the fact that the client complained of a “lack of progress” in the 
matrimonial action is not, in and of itself, a basis for reducing the fee.[127] The obligation of a 
client to pay the attorney is not conditioned on the success of the lawyer’s efforts.[128] 
D. Bill Padding 
          If an attorney is highly competent and expends five hours of effort to accomplish what 
most other attorneys would require ten hours to do, and the attorney then bills for ten hours of 
time to reflect the proper value of the work done, that would be illegal, unethical, and a breach of 
the lawyer’s fiduciary obligation.[129] The appropriate way for the attorney to obtain payment 
commensurate with his value is to reflect that value in a higher hourly rate or fixed fee. If an 
attorney has misstated his hours, then the arbitrator should, at a minimum, disallow the padded 
hours. 
If the bill padding was found to be egregious, then the arbitrator should not only eliminate the 
padded hours from the fee but may also diminish the fee by an amount to reflect the 
egregiousness of violating both the lawyer’s standard of care[130] and the fiduciary obligation to 
the client.[131] 
If the arbitrator concludes that the attorney has billed for more hours than should have been 
required to perform the work, then the additional hours being charged may be 
disallowed[132] and quantum meruit (the reasonable value of the services) would then be the 
appropriate measure of recovery under such circumstances.[133] 
E. Expenses and Disbursements 
          It is not uncommon for lawyers to bill clients for certain expenses that they incur on behalf 
of the client. These expenses may include secretarial, travel, long distance telephone calls, 
messenger, investigative, postage, overnight mail, copying, computerized legal research, meals, 
and others. Some are permissible expenses to be charged to the client and some are not.[134] 
The beginning point of the “expense” issue is the retainer agreement. The lawyer must list with 
clarity in the retainer agreement the expense items that will be billed to the client. If the retainer 
agreement confers authority on the lawyer to hire an expert witness at the client’s expense, then 
if the fee of the expert is unusually high or high in relation to the value of the marital estate, the 
attorney may be held to have nonetheless had an obligation to notify the client in advance of the 
expert’s fee and obtain consent. 
If a lawyer fails to identify costs that are to be paid by the client in the retainer agreement, then it 
may be proper to deny reimbursement to the lawyer for office costs such as long distance 
copying, faxing, and messengers. However, the client must remain responsible for litigation costs 
such as filing fees, expert witness fees (to which the client has consented), and court reporter 
costs. Even if the lawyer is still allowed to charge the client certain direct office-type costs 
despite not listing them in the retainer agreement, e.g., copying, long distance, outgoing faxes, it 
is not appropriate to mark up these items by adding a profit margin on top of actual costs.[135] If 
copying costs are listed in the retainer statement as being billed at 25¢ a page and faxes at $2.00 
per page, then it is likely that the lawyer is marking up these items by adding a profit 
margin.[136] It is debatable whether these mark-ups are permissible.[137] If these costs add up 
to substantial amounts, the arbitrator may determine that such mark-ups are unreasonable. 
Even if certain expenses are listed in the retainer agreement as being the responsibility of the 
client, that is not necessarily dispositive of the issue. For example, it is traditionally understood 
that secretarial services, library costs, rent, telephone, and utilities are a part of the lawyer’s 
overhead – which the attorney’s hourly or fixed rate must cover – and therefore are not properly 
billable to the client. 
Some courts disallow separate billing for computerized legal research services such as LEXIS 
and WESTLAW – even at cost – because they see such research costs as part of a firm’s 
overhead.[138] They compare such research costs to library costs that are not properly passed on 
to a client directly but rather are absorbed by the firm and paid for from hourly fee revenues. The 
trend, however, is to allow such separate billing of at least some part of these 
expenses,[139] provided that this is so stated in the retainer agreement. It is doubtful, however, 
that firms can mark up those services by adding a profit percentage.[140] If the retainer 
agreement does not indicate that a profit margin will be added to the computerized legal research 
service costs, then the mark-up should be disallowed.[141] If the lawyer has indicated a use rate 
in the retainer agreement which reflects a mark-up, but the existence of a mark-up is not 
specifically noted and the lawyer has not told the client that the costs will be marked up by the 
addition of a profit margin, then the mark-up may be disallowed.[142] 
Many law firms today employ paralegals to assist in the practice of law and separately bill for 
paralegal time just as they do for lawyer time. While it is arguable that a “reasonable attorney’s 
fee” means “a fee for services rendered by an individual who has been licensed to practice law,” 
the prevailing practice today is to allow such charges to be separately billed. That said, it is 
important to consider what work it is that the paralegal did. The mere fact that work has been 
done by a paralegal is not dispositive of the issue of whether that work was of a paralegal level 
for billing purposes. If the work involves delivering documents to the court house for filing, 
filing of documents in the office, obtaining a signature on a document, or typing a form 
document by filling in information elicited by the attorney from the client, the aforementioned 
are more properly characterized as secretarial work, and hourly billings for such work may be 
rejected because they are part of the lawyer’s overhead.[143] If the work being billed for 
involves legal research or investigative work, or the construction of legal documents where a 
more complex task is involved than merely filling in the blanks, that work, when done by a 
paralegal, may properly be separately billed for at the rate set forth in the retainer agreement. 
VI. TERMINATION BY THE CLIENT 
          Under New York law, a client has an absolute right to discharge an attorney at any time 
during the course of the representation, irrespective of whether there is legal cause to do 
so.[144] “If the discharge is without cause and before the completion of [the lawyer’s] services, 
then the amount of the attorney’s compensation must be determined on a quantum meruit 
basis.”[145] Quantum meruit is generally defined to mean the reasonable value of the service 
rendered. This rule, initially formulated to apply to attorneys hired on a contingency fee basis, 
has been extended to apply to hourly rate attorneys as well.[146] 
Accordingly, if a matrimonial lawyer was hired to represent a party in a divorce proceeding on 
an hourly rate basis and is discharged by the client prior to the completion of the task, then the 
attorney is not entitled to the hourly rate fee agreed upon but rather to quantum meruit – the 
reasonable value of the lawyer’s services. It is commonly supposed that quantum meruit in the 
matrimonial context is the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours 
reasonably expended by the attorney, and therefore, the fee agreement may be looked to for a 
determination of a reasonable hourly rate. However, the factors set forth above, to determine the 
reasonableness of a fee are also the factors to be used in the calculation of quantum 
meruit.[147] Therefore, a quantum meruit calculation can yield a fee that could be more or less 
than the fee set in the retainer agreement.[148] Nonetheless, it would be inconsistent with the 
consumer protection purposes that underlay the establishing of the matrimonial fee arbitration 
process – except in the most unusual of circumstances – for an arbitrator to award a matrimonial 
attorney more than the fee established in the retainer agreement. This position is accentuated by 
the fact that a client may well have discharged the lawyer for valid reason, but even if that can be 
reasonably described as “good cause,” that usually falls short of the “legal cause” that would 
entitle the client to offset some or all of the fee claims.[149] 
In conducting matrimonial fee arbitration where the attorney has been discharged prior to the 
completion of services, the arbitrator should be guided by the same principles of justice, equity, 
and reasonableness as would apply if the attorney had completed the services which were the 
subject of a fee dispute. 
VII. STANDARD OF CARE, FIDUCIARY AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
A. Claims of Malpractice 
          Clients contesting lawyers’ fees often assert by way of defense that the attorney violated 
the standard of care owed to the client, i.e., committed the tort of malpractice.[150] When such a 
claim is raised in a matrimonial fee arbitration proceeding, it is incumbent on the arbitrator, for 
the reasons set out herein, to give full consideration to the client’s claim. 
If a client claims that the fee is excessive because, inter alia, the attorney neglected the client’s 
case, lacked adequate skills and knowledge, or did a poor job in representing the client 
(incompetence) or failed to: prepare adequately for hearings, investigate properly the facts or the 
other spouse’s financial circumstances, or retain necessary experts such as a child psychologist 
or forensic accountant, the client is also raising claims that sound in malpractice. These 
assertions, which are both arguments that the fee is excessive and that malpractice has been 
committed, are for all practical purposes identical in this context and amount to a claim that the 
way the case was handled adversely affected the value of the lawyer’s services to the client, and 
should therefore result in a fee reduction or elimination.[151] 
Under New York law, where a client raises issues of malpractice in a court action involving the 
value of professional services or in fee arbitration, the outcomes of both the court action and the 
arbitration are usually preclusive of the malpractice claim. Stated simply, the client cannot 
thereafter sue the attorney for malpractice.[152] This is because the quality of the lawyer’s work 
is necessarily taken into account by the judge or the arbitrator in determining the amount of the 
fee to which the attorney is entitled.[153] Accordingly, failure of the arbitrator to take the 
client’s claims of malpractice into account may well result in the forfeiture of all client rights to 
assert a claim of malpractice against the attorney. 
Quite apart from its preclusive effect on any subsequent action for malpractice, the policy issues 
promoting fee arbitration should lead the arbitrator to give full consideration to a client’s claim 
of malpractice. As noted above, fee issues and malpractice claims are often 
intertwined;[154] forcing the client to bring a separate malpractice action to protect his interests 
is likely to undermine the purposes of fee arbitration by substantially inflating the cost of seeking 
an equitable disposition of a dispute between client and lawyer. 
Even if the client does not specifically, or knowingly, raise issues of malpractice, it is not 
unlikely that if the client thereafter seeks to sue the lawyer for malpractice, a court will find that 
the issue of the lawyer’s competence “was reasonably and plainly comprehended to be within the 
scope of the [fee] dispute submitted to arbitration.”[155] Nonetheless, the arbitration program 
created by the Matrimonial Rules is not intended to be a forum for the adjudication of significant 
malpractice claims.[156] Moreover, quite apart from this intent, fee arbitrations of the type that 
take place under the Matrimonial Rules are simply not an appropriate forum for the adjudication 
of malpractice issues. Generally, clients in matrimonial fee disputes invoking fee arbitration will 
be ill-informed about the legal technicalities of breach of the standard of care. Moreover, there 
are usually no witnesses testifying on the issue and often little more will be available to the 
arbitrator besides the competing claims of the lawyer and client. 
Therefore, even apart from general criticisms of the preclusion policy,[157] the policy of 
preclusion is especially ill-suited for application to matrimonial fee arbitration as provided for in 
New York. However, until such time as the preclusion issue is held inapplicable, then for the 
reasons stated, arbitrators must accept and consider evidence relating to claims of malpractice, 
but only to the extent that such claims affect the fees to which the attorney is entitled. In deciding 
the appropriate level of fees to be awarded, the arbitrator should evaluate whether the alleged 
malpractice affected the value of the services provided to the client in the disputed matter. If the 
attorney’s actions reduced the value of the services, the arbitrator should reduce the fee to 
account for the decreased value. However, while the matrimonial fee arbitrator may award a 
refund of unearned fees and/or costs that were previously paid to the attorneys, the arbitrator may 
not affirmatively award damages to the client. In other words, the matrimonial fee arbitrator who 
finds that the attorney committed malpractice can deny the attorney’s fee claim and order 
disgorgement of fees previously paid, but may not award any amounts beyond that to the client. 
If a client asserts claims of malpractice, or which sound in malpractice, and it appears that the 
client has a viable claim for damages substantially in excess of the amount of the fees paid or 
claimed, then the arbitrator may wish to interrupt the proceedings and notify the Administrative 
Judge of the judicial district so that the latter can determine whether to discontinue the 
arbitration.[158] If the Administrative Judge decides to proceed with the arbitration, then the 
arbitrator may inform the client of the likelihood that he or she is foregoing the right to bring a 
subsequent malpractice claim in a court so that the client can consider whether to proceed with 
the arbitration. 
B. Breach of Fiduciary Obligation 
          While malpractice concerns a lawyer’s standard of care, a breach of fiduciary conduct is 
said to involve the lawyer’s standard of conduct.[159] The attorney-client relationship is 
fiduciary in nature and is governed by a series of special obligations imposed on the lawyer for 
the client’s benefit. The fiduciary obligations of the lawyer include: maintaining confidentiality; 
acting with undivided loyalty; avoiding conflicts of interest; operating competently; presenting 
information and advice honestly and freely; acting fairly; and safeguarding client 
property.[160] In some instances, malpractice and fiduciary obligation overlap. But claims, for 
example, that the lawyer disclosed confidential information, had a conflict of interest, did not 
secure the client’s informed consent to the fee agreement or the settlement, or engaged in self-
interested behavior at the client’s expense, constitute claims of breach of fiduciary obligation. 
Unlike malpractice, however, establishing a violation of a lawyer’s fiduciary obligation does not 
require proof of causation of specific injury or actual damages.[161] The theory is that the 
lawyer, as fiduciary, is in a position of trust and has agreed to perform compensable services. If 
he breaches that trust, then he is not entitled to a full measure of compensation. Denying some, 
or the entire fee, minimizes the incentive for the fiduciary to breach his duty of loyalty. 
The prevailing rule is that a lawyer engaging in a clear and serious violation of duty to the client 
can be required to forfeit some, or all, of the lawyer’s fee – whether or not it has already been 
paid.[162] Accordingly, ignoring such breaches in the course of fee arbitration – that is, allowing 
a lawyer to obtain a fee that fiduciary law would limit or disallow – violates a client’s correlative 
fiduciary rights.[163] 
It is not clear that New York courts regard claims of breach of fiduciary obligation as precluded 
by a fee arbitration proceeding, as they do with regard to claims of legal malpractice. 
Nonetheless, it is at least not unlikely that courts would so conclude. Therefore, and for 
independent policy reasons, arbitrators may take into account whether an attorney has breached a 
fiduciary obligation to the matrimonial client and, if so, the seriousness of the violation, which in 
turn determines the degree to which fees should be forfeited or disgorged.[164] 
C. Effect of Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility on Fees 
          Many fiduciary obligations of the lawyer are codified in New York’s ethical code, titled 
Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and promulgated as joint rules of 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.[165] Indeed, much of the law of professional 
responsibility is a codification of fiduciary doctrine; therefore, an attorney breaching a fiduciary 
standard often violates a specific ethical admonition as well.[166] Ethical rules are a source of 
protection granted to clients apart from the rights accruing to them under fiduciary law. 
Violations of the ethical rules can result in disciplinary sanctions including a letter of caution, an 
admonition, a reprimand, suspension of the license to practice law, and disbarment.[167] In 
addition, a lawyer who commits serious ethical violation can be barred from receiving any 
fee.[168] 
The Appellate Division, under authority conferred by statute,[169] has created the mechanism 
for enforcement of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[170] Whereas enforcement of the 
Code is not a function of fee arbitration, arbitrators should not be indifferent to clear violations 
of the Code of Professional Responsibility that damage the client’s interests. As a leading ethics 
scholar has stated, “a lawyer may forfeit the right to a fee if the lawyer committed a breach of a 
statute or lawyer code that violated the lawyer’s duty toward his or her client during the course 
of the representation.”[171] 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
          In the final analysis, the arbitrator’s task is not quantifiable. If the procedural requirements 
of the matrimonial rules have been met, then the fee may be presumed valid, but it is still subject 
to a requirement of reasonableness. As these materials have made clear, the concept of 
reasonableness is highly elastic and there is no formulaic template that can be applied to 
determine when a fee is excessive.[172] Despite the ubiquity of attorney-client fee arbitration in 
the United States, there has apparently been no attempt to publish a substantive manual on fee 
arbitration or guide for fee arbitrators. This effort – which should be regarded as a work in 
progress – is an attempt to fill that void. Much work, however, remains to be done including 
empirical analysis of what matrimonial fee arbitrators are actually doing.[173] 
  
  
APPENDIX A 
Retainer Agreement 
1. Names and addresses of the parties entering into the agreement; 
2. Nature of the services to be rendered; 
3. Amount of the advance retainer, if any, and what it is intended to cover; 
4. Circumstances under which any portion of the advance retainer may be refunded. Should the 
attorney withdraw from the case or be discharged prior to the depletion of the advance retainer, 
the written retainer agreement shall provide how the attorney’s fees and expenses are to be 
determined, and the remainder of the advance retainer shall be refunded to the client; 
5. Client’s right to cancel the agreement at any time; how the attorney’s fee will be determined 
and paid should the client discharge the attorney at any time during the course of the 
representation; 
6. How the attorney will be paid through the conclusion of the case after the retainer is depleted; 
whether the client may be asked to pay another lump sum; 
7. Hourly rate of each person whose time may be charged to the client; any out-of-pocket 
disbursements for which the client will be required to reimburse the attorney. Any changes in 
such rates or fees shall be incorporated into a written agreement constituting an amendment to 
the original agreement, which must be signed by the client before it may take effect; 
8. Any clause providing for a fee in addition to the agreed-upon rate, such as a reasonable 
minimum fee clause, must be defined in plain language and set forth the circumstances under 
which such fee may be incurred and how it will be calculated; 
9. Frequency of itemized billing, which shall be at least every 60 days; the client may not be 
charged for time spent in discussion of the bills received; 
10. Client’s right to be provided with copies of correspondence and documents relating to the 
case, and to be kept apprised of the status of the case; 
11. Whether and under what circumstances the attorney might seek a security interest from the 
client, which can be obtained only upon court approval and on notice to the adversary; 
12. Under what circumstances the attorney might seek to withdraw from the case for 
nonpayment of fees, and the attorney’s right to seek a charging lien from the court; 
13. Should a dispute arise concerning the attorney’s fee, the client may seek arbitration; the 
attorney shall provide information concerning fee arbitration in the event of such dispute or upon 
the client’s request. 
  
APPENDIX B 
Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities 
• Your attorney is providing you with this document to inform you of what you, as a client, are 
entitled to by law or by custom. To help prevent any misunderstanding between you and your 
attorney please read this document carefully. 
• If you ever have any questions about these rights, or about the way your case is being handled, 
do not hesitate to ask your attorney. He or she should be readily available to represent your best 
interests and keep you informed about your case. 
• An attorney may not refuse to represent you on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, sexual 
orientation, age, national origin or disability. 
• You are entitled to an attorney who will be capable of handling your case; show you courtesy 
and consideration at all times; represent you zealously; and preserve your confidences and 
secrets that are revealed in the course of the relationship. 
• You are entitled to a written retainer agreement which must set forth, in plain language, the 
nature of the relationship and the details of the fee arrangement. At your request, and before you 
sign the agreement, you are entitled to have your attorney clarify in writing any of its terms, or 
include additional provisions. 
• You are entitled to fully understand the proposed rates and retainer fee before you sign a 
retainer agreement, as in any other contract. 
• You may refuse to enter into any fee arrangement that you find unsatisfactory. 
• Your attorney may not request a fee that is contingent on the securing of a divorce or on the 
amount of money or property that may be obtained. 
• Your attorney may not request a retainer fee that is nonrefundable. That is, should you 
discharge your attorney, or should your attorney withdraw from the case, before the retainer is 
used up, he or she is entitled to be paid commensurate with the work performed on your case and 
any expenses, but must return the balance of the retainer to you. However, your attorney may 
enter into a minimum fee arrangement with you that provides for the payment of a specific 
amount below which the fee will not fall based upon the handling of the case to its conclusion. 
• You are entitled to know the approximate number of attorneys and other legal staff members 
who will be working on your case at any given time and what you will be charged for the 
services of each. 
• You are entitled to know in advance how you will be asked to pay legal fees and expenses, and 
how the retainer, if any, will be spent. 
• At your request, and after your attorney has had a reasonable opportunity to investigate your 
case, you are entitled to be given an estimate of approximate future costs of your case, which 
estimate shall be made in good faith but may be subject to change due to facts and circumstances 
affecting the case. 
• You are entitled to receive a written, itemized bill on a regular basis, at least every 60 days. 
• You are expected to review the itemized bills sent by counsel, and to raise any objections or 
errors in a timely manner. Time spent in discussion or explanation of bills will not be charged to 
you. 
• You are expected to be truthful in all discussions with your attorney, and to provide all relevant 
information and documentation to enable him or her to competently prepare your case. 
• You are entitled to be kept informed of the status of your case, and to be provided with copies 
of correspondence and documents prepared on your behalf or received from the court or your 
adversary. 
• You have the right to be present in court at the time that conferences are held. 
• You are entitled to make the ultimate decision on the objectives to be pursued in your case, and 
to make the final decision regarding the settlement of your case. 
• Your attorney’s written retainer agreement must specify under what circumstances he or she 
might seek to withdraw as your attorney for nonpayment of legal fees. If an action or proceeding 
is pending, the court may give your attorney a “charging lien,” which entitles your attorney to 
payment for services already rendered at the end of the case out of the proceeds of the final order 
or judgment. 
• You are under no legal obligation to sign a confession of judgment or promissory note, or to 
agree to a lien or mortgage on your home to cover legal fees. Your attorney’s written retainer 
agreement must specify whether, and under what circumstances, such security may be requested. 
In no event may such security interest be obtained by your attorney without prior court approval 
and notice to your adversary. An attorney’s security interest in the marital residence cannot be 
foreclosed against you. 
• You are entitled to have your attorney’s best efforts exerted on your behalf, but no particular 
results can be guaranteed. 
• If you entrust money with an attorney for an escrow deposit in your case, the attorney must 
safeguard the escrow in a special bank account. You are entitled to a written escrow agreement, a 
written receipt, and a complete record concerning the escrow. When the terms of the escrow 
agreement have been performed, the attorney must promptly make payment of the escrow to all 
persons who are entitled to it. 
• In the event of a fee dispute, you may have the right to seek arbitration. Your attorney will 
provide you with the necessary information regarding arbitration in the event of a fee dispute, or 
upon your request. 
Receipt Acknowledged: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Attorney’s signature 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Client’s signature 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Date 
  
APPENDIX C 
Part 1400. Procedure For Attorneys In Domestic Relations Matters 
§ 1400.1 Application 
This Part shall apply to all attorneys who, on or after November 30, 1993, undertake to represent 
a client in a claim, action or proceeding, or preliminary to the filing of a claim, action or 
proceeding, in either Supreme Court or Family Court, or in any court of appellate jurisdiction, 
for divorce, separation, annulment, custody, visitation, maintenance, child support, or alimony, 
or to enforce or modify a judgment or order in connection with any such claims, actions or 
proceedings. This Part shall not apply to attorneys representing clients without compensation 
paid by the client, except that where the client is other than a minor, the provisions of section 
1400.2 shall apply to the extent they are not applicable to compensation. 
§ 1400.2 Statement Of Client’s Rights And Responsibilities 
An attorney shall provide a prospective client with a Statement Of Client’s Rights And 
Responsibilities, in a form prescribed by the Appellate Divisions, at the initial conference and 
prior to the signing of a written retainer agreement. If the attorney is not being paid a fee from 
the client for the work to be performed on the particular case, the attorney may delete from the 
statement those provisions dealing with fees. The attorney shall obtain a signed acknowledgment 
of receipt from the client. 
§ 1400.3 Written Retainer Agreement 
An attorney who undertakes to represent a party and enters into an arrangement for, charges or 
collects any fee from a client shall execute a written agreement with the client setting forth in 
plain language the terms of compensation and the nature of services to be rendered. The 
agreement, and any amendment thereto, shall be signed by both client and attorney, and, in 
actions in Supreme Court, a copy of the signed agreement shall be filed with the court with the 
statement of net worth. Where substitution of counsel occurs after the filing of the net worth 
statement, a signed copy of the attorney’s retainer agreement shall be filed with the court within 
10 days of its execution. A copy of a signed amendment shall be filed within 15 days of signing. 
A duplicate copy of the filed agreement and any amendment shall be provided to the client. The 
agreement shall be subject to the provisions governing confidentiality contained in Domestic 
Relations Law, section 235(1). 
§ 1400.4 Nonrefundable Retainer Fee 
An attorney shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect a nonrefundable retainer fee 
from a client. An attorney may enter into a “minimum fee” arrangement with a client that 
provides for the payment of a specific amount below which the fee will not fall based upon the 
handling of the case to its conclusion. 
§ 1400.5 Security Interests 
(a) An attorney may obtain a confession of judgment or promissory note, take a lien on real 
property, or otherwise obtain a security interest to secure his or her fee only where: 
(1) the retainer agreement provides that a security interest may be sought; 
(2) notice of an application for a security interest has been given to the other spouse; and, 
(3) the court grants approval for the security interest after submission of an application for 
counsel fees. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of this section, an attorney shall not 
foreclose on a mortgage placed on the marital residence while the spouse who consents to the 
mortgage remains the titleholder and the residence remains the spouse’s primary residence.  
§ 1400.6 [Deleted] 
§ 1400.7 Fee Arbitration 
In the event of a fee dispute between attorney and client, the client may seek to resolve the 
dispute by arbitration, pursuant to a fee arbitration program established and operated by the 
Chief Administrator of the Courts and subject to the approval of the justices of the Appellate 
Divisions. 
  
APPENDIX D 
Part 136. Fee Arbitration In Domestic Relations Matters 
§ 136.1 Application 
This Part shall apply where representation has commenced on or after November 30, 1993, to all 
attorneys who undertake to represent a client in a claim, action or proceeding, or preliminary to 
the filing of a claim, action or proceeding, in either Supreme Court or Family Court, or in any 
court of appellate jurisdiction, for divorce, separation, annulment, custody, visitation, 
maintenance, child support, alimony, or to enforce or modify a judgment or order in connection 
with any such claims, actions or proceedings. 
§ 136.2 General 
In the event of a fee dispute between attorney and client, whether or not the attorney already has 
received the fee in dispute, the client may seek to resolve the dispute by arbitration, which shall 
be binding upon both attorney and client. A client may request arbitration pursuant to section 
136.5(e) of this Part either in response to notice from the attorney pursuant to section 136.5(a), 
upon consent pursuant to section 136.5(d), or upon the client’s own initiative. 
§ 136.3 Organization and Appointment 
(a) The Administrative Judge of each judicial district shall organize and administer a fee 
arbitration program in each judicial district pursuant to the rules contained in this Part. For 
purposes of this Part, Nassau and Suffolk Counties shall each be designated a judicial district. 
(b) The Administrative Judge shall appoint attorneys and laypersons to participate in the 
program, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Administrative Judge and without compensation. 
Attorneys must reside or maintain an office in, and laypersons must work or reside in, the 
judicial district for which the program is established. The Administrative Judge shall consult 
with local bar associations with respect to the appointments made in each geographic area. Each 
person appointed as an arbitrator shall file with the Administrative Judge an oath or affirmation 
to faithfully and fairly try all actions that come before him or her. 
(c) Disputes involving a sum less than $3000 shall be submitted to one attorney arbitrator. For 
purposes of this Part, the term “panel” shall include a single arbitrator unless the context requires 
otherwise. 
(d) Disputes involving a sum of $3000 or more shall be submitted to a panel of three arbitrators, 
consisting of one attorney, one layperson, and a third panel member who shall be selected at 
random from a pool of arbitrators comprised of both attorneys and laypersons. The chair shall be 
an attorney, who shall be selected by the panel members if more than one attorney is on the 
panel. 
(e) The Administrative Judge shall be responsible for the administration of the arbitration 
program and shall distribute and maintain all necessary documentation required for purposes of 
the operation of the program. All papers required to be filed in connection with the arbitration 
proceeding shall be delivered to the Administrative Judge. The Administrative Judge may 
designate such persons as may be necessary to assist in the administration of the program. 
§ 136.4 Jurisdiction 
(a) The arbitration program may not hear any fee dispute in which the amount in dispute is in 
excess of $100,000, including disbursements. 
(b) The Administrative Judge may decline to accept or continue to arbitrate a dispute in which 
substantial legal questions are raised in addition to the basic fee dispute or with respect to which 
no attorney’s services have been rendered for at least two years. 
§ 136.5 Arbitration Procedure 
(a) Where the attorney and client cannot agree as to the attorney’s fee, the attorney shall inform 
the client in writing by certified mail or by personal service that he or she has 30 days from 
receipt of the notice in which to elect to resolve the dispute by arbitration, the result of which is 
binding upon both attorney and client. The attorney must include standard instructions developed 
by the Chief Administrator regarding the arbitration procedure, and a copy of a request for 
arbitration. 
(b) If the client does not file the request for arbitration within the 30-day period, the attorney may 
commence an action to recover the fee and the client no longer shall have the right to request 
arbitration pursuant to this Part with respect to the fee dispute at issue. 
(c) An attorney who institutes an action to recover a fee must allege in the complaint that the 
client received notice under this rule of his or her right to pursue arbitration and did not file a 
timely request for arbitration. 
(d) A client also may consent to the attorney’s request to submit the dispute to arbitration. Such 
consent must be obtained in writing prior to the initiation of the proceeding. The request for or 
consent to arbitration shall specify that the client has received and read the standard instructions 
developed by the Chief Administrator regarding the arbitration procedure, and that the client 
waives his or her right to otherwise pursue the claim and agrees to be bound by the determination 
of the arbitration panel. 
(e) If the client elects to submit the dispute to arbitration, the client shall file the request for 
arbitration with the Administrative Judge in the judicial district which has or would have 
jurisdiction over the marital dispute, unless another is designated by the Chief Administrator. 
Upon receipt of the request for arbitration, the Administrative Judge shall serve a copy of the 
request upon the named attorney and forward an “attorney fee response” to be completed by the 
attorney and returned to the Administrative Judge within 20 days. The attorney shall include with 
the response a certification that a copy of the response was served upon the client. 
(f) Upon receipt of the attorney’s response, the Administrative Judge shall designate the 
arbitrator or arbitrators who will hear the dispute and shall schedule a hearing. The parties must 
receive at least 10 days notice in writing of the time and place of the hearing. 
(g) The client has 30 days following the filing of the request for arbitration within which to 
withdraw from the process, but in no event may the client withdraw after the arbitration has 
commenced. Withdrawal shall be by notice to the Administrative Judge. 
(h) The hearing shall be held within 60 days of the receipt by the Administrative Judge of the 
request for arbitration. 
§ 136.6 Arbitration Hearing 
(a) The rules of evidence need not be observed at the hearing, and a stenographic or other record 
may be made. Arbitrators shall have the power to issue subpoenas and to administer oaths. 
Parties shall have the right to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be on the attorney to prove the reasonableness of the fee by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The attorney shall present documentation of the work performed 
and the billing history. The client may then present his or her account of the services rendered 
and time expended. Witnesses may be called, and the client shall have the right of final reply. 
§ 136.7 Determination of the Panel 
(a) The determination shall be signed by the panel of arbitrators or by at least a majority of them. 
(b) Within 30 days following the hearing, the panel shall serve upon both parties by certified 
mail a copy of its written determination, and also shall transmit the original of the determination 
to the Administrative Judge. 
§ 136.8 Review 
The client or attorney may seek review of the arbitration award pursuant to Article 75 of the 
Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
§ 136.9 Confidentiality 
All proceedings commenced and conducted in accordance with this Part shall be confidential, 
except to the extent necessary to take ancillary legal action with respect to a fee matter. 
§ 136.10 Refusal to Participate in Arbitration 
All attorneys are required to participate in the arbitration process upon the filing of the request 
for arbitration by a client in conformance with these rules. An attorney who refuses to submit to 
the arbitration process shall be referred to the local grievance committee of the Appellate 
Division for disciplinary action. 
§ 136.11 Records of Arbitration Determinations 
The determination of the arbitration panel shall be retained by the arbitration program. 
  
APPENDIX E 
22 NYCRR Part 1200, § 1200.11 Fee For Legal Services [DR 2-106] 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or excessive fee. 
(b) A fee is excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be 
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be 
considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee may include the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly. 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent or made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. 
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by circumstances. 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services. 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(c) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect: 
(1) . . . . 
(2) Any fee in a domestic relations matter: 
(i) the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or in any way 
determined by reference to the amount of maintenance, support, equitable distribution, or 
property settlement; 
(ii) unless a written retainer agreement is signed by the lawyer and client setting forth in plain 
language the nature of the relationship and the details of the fee arrangement. A lawyer shall not 
include in the written retainer agreement a nonrefundable fee clause; or 
(iii) based upon a security interest, confession of judgment or other lien, without prior notice to 
the client in a signed retainer agreement and approval from a tribunal after notice to the 
adversary. A lawyer shall not foreclose on a mortgage placed on the marital residence while the 
spouse who consents to the mortgage remains the titleholder and the residence remains the 
spouse’s primary residence. 
(3) A fee proscribed by law or rule of court. 
(d) . . . . 
(e) In domestic relations matters, a lawyer shall resolve fee disputes by arbitration at the election 
of the client. 
(f) In domestic relations matters, a lawyer shall provide a prospective client with a Statement Of 
Client’s Rights And Responsibilities at the initial conference and prior to the signing of a written 
retainer agreement. 
 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. This article is 
an expanded version of a guide that I prepared for arbitrators participating in New York’s 
mandatory attorney-client matrimonial fee arbitration program in response to a request by a 
colleague, Professor Lela Love, a nationally recognized ADR expert who conducts training 
programs for the New York State Unified Court System. After demurring at first, I finally 
succumbed to a persistent appeal based in part upon obligations devolving from my having 
written extensively in the area of attorney fees and the artfully posed challenge to actually 
engage the issue of unreasonable fees in a practical context. My task – to deal with the 
substantive issues raised by arbitration – could be encapsulated in a single query: how does an 
arbitrator determine whether a fee is reasonable? 
I began by doing the obvious: contacting other mandatory fee arbitration programs around the 
country to obtain the substantive training guides that they had prepared. After extensive 
investigation, I learned, much to my chagrin, that no program, mandatory or otherwise, has 
prepared such a guide; indeed, none exists. To do the training properly, I concluded that I would 
have to fill that void. 
Identifying the specific components that an arbitrator should take into account in determining 
whether the fee sought is reasonable, and if not, how to determine what is a reasonable fee, is a 
formidable task. It will not do to say, with apologies to Mr. Justice Potter Stewart, “I know a 
reasonable fee when I see it.” Nor will it do to merely recite the eight factors set forth in Rule 1.5 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and DR 2-106 of the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. That simply fails to capture the essential task of the arbitrator. Moreover, the task 
is perhaps complicated by the fact that in New York, when the fee dispute is at least $3000, a 
panel of three arbitrators is appointed, one of whom must be a layperson. See infra Appendix D § 
136.3. 
Since 46 jurisdictions now have attorney-client fee arbitration programs, including 12 states with 
mandatory fee arbitration programs, the need for some kind of guide is manifest. By preparing 
the first such guide, one that reflects a scholarly approach, it is my intent both to stimulate 
publication activity focusing on other fee arbitration programs and jump start a national colloquy 
with respect to a number of the substantive “reasonable fee” issues that I have addressed. 
Arbitration and especially fee arbitration is a low-visibility but yet high volume enterprise. Little 
is known about the principles of decision that prevail. This article may be seen as an attempt to 
illuminate a part of the on-going fee arbitration process. 
I am indebted to Deborah Kahn and Jay Butterman of the New York matrimonial firm 
Butterman, Kahn & Gardner, LLP, who have provided me with invaluable assistance, including 
insight into the practical aspects of matrimonial law practice and a well reasoned critique, from 
the perspective of practicing lawyers, of several of the conclusions I reached. I am also indebted 
to Professors Vivian Berger and Lela Love who critiqued drafts of the article. In the course of 
compiling information about other fee arbitration programs, I have received assistance from 
James Towery, Chairman of the ABA Committee on Client Protection; Jerry Larkin of the 
Illinois Attorney Disciplinary Commission; David Johnson, Director – Attorney Ethics of the 
New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts; and Jill Sperber, Director of the Mandatory Fee 
Arbitration Program of the State Bar of California. Finally, I wish to thank my research assistant, 
Kevin Heller for his assistance in carrying out this project. 
[1] According to a recent poll, 69 percent of Americans believe lawyers are only sometimes 
honest or not usually honest and 56 percent say lawyers use the system to protect the powerful 
and enrich themselves. Stephen Budiansky, How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. News & World 
Report, Jan. 30, 1995 at 50, 51. A National Law Journal survey, reflecting findings of a national 
poll conducted in mid-July 1993, found lawyers less well respected than any occupational group 
except politicians, and reported the following changes from an earlier poll conducted in 1986: an 
increase in the regard of lawyers as “less honest” than most people from 17% to 31%; and an 
increase in the belief that lawyers charge too much from 23% to 43%. See Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 
1993, at B3. See also Gary A. Hengstler, The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A.J., 
Sept. 1993, at 60. (a large percentage of Americans view attorneys as unethical, 
uncompassionate and greedy) (hereinafter ABA Poll). 
[2] Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 277 
(citing Report of Commission on Professionalism to the Bd. of Governors and House of 
Delegates of the ABA, 112 FRD 243, (1986)); see also Special Commission on Resolution of 
Disputes of ABA Section of the Bar, The Resolution of Fee Disputes: A Report and Model By-
Laws, 1974 [“Disputes concerning fees are universally recognized as constituting the most 
serious problem in the relationship between the Bar and the public.”]; ABA Poll, id. (complaints 
concerning fee disputes are the most common grievance claimed by the public). 
[3] Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary System: 
The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1339, 1354, 1369 (1996). 
According to the Committee of Professional Discipline of the Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York, “[e]ach year, disciplinary authorities in the State of New York receive a 
substantial number of complaints alleging that lawyers’ services were overpriced or incompetent. 
Pure fee disputes or mixed disputes (that is, disputes involving both fees and charges of minor 
neglect or incompetence) can consume a significant percentage of the scarce resources of 
disciplinary systems. Ultimately, the authorities dismiss the great majority of these complaints 
because they do not involve violations of disciplinary rules.” Helping Lawyers and Clients to 
Resolve Fee Disputes: A Proposal for a Pilot Program, 49 The Record of the Bar of the City of 
New York 279. 
[4] “The existing system of regulating the profession is narrowly focused on violations of 
professional ethics. It provides no mechanism to handle other types of clients’ complaints. The 
system does not usually address complaints that the lawyer’s service was overpriced or 
unreasonably slow. The system does not usually address complaints of incompetence or 
negligence except where the conduct was egregious or repeated.” Lawyer Regulation for a New 
Century: Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement at the American 
Bar Association (the “McKay Commission”) (1991), at xv. 
[5] See Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs, ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection 
(2000); seealso ABA Model Rules for Fee Arbitration, adopted Feb. 23, 1995. 
[6] New York has recently adopted a statewide fee dispute arbitration program that will apply to 
all attorney-client relationships formed after June 1, 2001, not just matrimonial fee disputes. 
Effective January 1, 2002, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136 will no longer be binding 
and will be replaced by the broader provisions of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 137 
entitled Part 137 Fee Dispute Resolution Program. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 137, Part 
137 Fee Dispute Resolution Program (2002). See also John Caher, Arbitration Required For 
Most Fee Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at 1, col. 4. 
[7] The McKay Commission found that the thousands of complaints being dismissed every year 
symbolized a significant gap between client expectations and the existing system of attorney 
regulation. Accordingly, the Commission recommended the establishment of mandatory fee 
arbitration programs in all jurisdictions. Id. At the time of the McKay Commission’s 
recommendation, six jurisdictions had mandatory fee arbitration programs: Alaska, California, 
Maine, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Wyoming. Most other states had enacted statutes 
offering voluntary fee arbitration on a statewide basis. A few jurisdictions, including New York, 
offered no statewide system of fee arbitration. Today there are ten jurisdictions where fee 
arbitration is mandatory if requested by the client: the six listed above and New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and the District of Columbia. In addition, there are six states where if the client 
requests fee arbitration, and the attorney chooses not to participate, the matter proceeds ex 
parteand the attorney will be nonetheless bound unless he institutes a suit to recover the 
contested fee within a certain amount of time prescribed by statute. The six states with this type 
of statute are: Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, and Nevada. Finally, in Wisconsin, 
if the client requests fee arbitration, and the attorney refuses to participate, the client may request 
an advisory opinion. See Bruce R Meckler, Mari Henry Leigh, and Robert J. Ambrose, Survey of 
State Arbitration Provisions, 3 Mealey’s Attorney Fees 27 (July 2001). 
[8] Woman in Divorce: Lawyers, Ethics, Fees and Fairness, New York City Department of 
Consumer Affairs, March 1992. 
[9] See Report of the Committee to Examine Lawyer Conduct in Matrimonial Actions, May 4, 
1993. 
[10] Id. at 24. The Committee’s proposal for a fee arbitration program in matrimonial cases was 
made after an examination of fee arbitration programs in New Jersey, California, and Erie 
County, New York. 
[11] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1400, entitled “Procedure for Attorneys in Domestic 
Relations Matter,” took effect on November 30, 1993. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 
1400.7 (2001) states: 
In the event of a fee dispute between attorney and client, the client may seek to resolve the 
dispute by arbitration, pursuant to a fee arbitration program established and operated by the 
Chief Administrator of the Courts and subject to the approval of the Justices of the Appellate 
Divisions. 
[12] Status Report of the Committee to Track the New Matrimonial Rules to the Chief Judge and 
Chief Administrative Judge, February 1995. The Committee reported that the comments received 
from the attorneys who responded to the survey were mixed. Several commentators expressed 
frustration with the fee arbitration program, while others were enthusiastic and considered it a 
positive aspect of the new matrimonial rules. 
[13] Divorce Lawyers Win Most Fee Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 1995. Suffolk County had 
received more fee arbitration requests than any other county in the State at the time. The Law 
Journal reported that “[i]n 80 percent of the 30 cases in Suffolk that were decided by arbitration, 
attorneys were found entitled to more than half the amount in dispute.” According to the Law 
Journal, the Suffolk County statistics were consistent with reports received from lawyers 
elsewhere in the State who felt that they were getting “a fair shake” from the domestic relations 
fee arbitration program. 
[14] The Domestic Relations Fee Arbitration Program: A Report to the Chief Judge and Chief 
Administrative Judge (of New York), November 1996 (hereinafter Report). According to 
the Report, program usage had increased steadily since the program’s inception. 1996 requests 
were projected to exceed 1995 requests by more than 50%. Approximately two-thirds (65%) of 
the requests for arbitration proceeded to an arbitration hearing, whereas 35% of requests resulted 
in no hearing or settlement. Of the requests that resulted in no hearing or settlement, 
approximately 60% were recent applications for which no hearing had yet been held. The 
remaining 40% included cases that were withdrawn, not pursued by the client, or dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. The overall percentage of arbitration requests that resulted in a settlement by 
the parties was approximately 13%. Id. at 10. 
[15] Id. at 42. If an attorney bills $10,000, and the client disputes only $2000 of that fee, then for 
purposes of the statistic, only $2000 is in dispute. 
A review of the awards reveals little basis for dissatisfaction on the part of attorneys; they are 
winning most fee disputes. That is, in most cases the attorney was found entitled to the majority 
of the amount in dispute, with the average award amounting to nearly three-quarters of the 
amount in dispute. To be sure, the attorney’s fee was reduced in most cases; but fee arbitration 
also saves the attorney the time, effort and expense he or she would have incurred in litigation. 
Moreover, fee arbitration is one way to avoid the almost inevitable counterclaim for malpractice 
that arises in litigation of fee disputes. Id. at 41-42. The Report went on to note: 
Statistics on fee arbitration outcomes are difficult to come by. Most states do not keep them or 
will 
not make them public for fear they will have a chilling effect on program participation. What few 
statistics are available indicate that clients win fee reductions in the majority of cases, although 
the 
amount of the reduction is not disclosed. A 1991 National Law Journal article surveyed 8 bar-run 
programs and found that clients won fee reductions, whether large or small, in 402 of the 622 
cases reported. The Joint Committee on Fee Disputes and Conciliation, which is made up of the 
New York County Lawyers Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and 
the Bronx County Bar Association, sponsors a voluntary fee dispute resolution program. The 
program reported that in 1991 clients won reductions 64% of the time. 
Id. 
[16] This report does not suggest that a central administrative entity should pass on the 
qualifications and competency of arbitrators or dictate policy and practice independently of local 
administrators. This report does suggest that the present level of support provided to local 
administrators of the fee arbitration program requires enhancement. It is beyond dispute, for 
instance, that the integrity and success of the fee arbitration program is greatly dependent on the 
court system’s utilization of arbitrators who are demonstrably fair and competent and who 
possess appropriate backgrounds and qualifications; yet, to date, the court system has not 
adopted any uniform guidelines or standards for screening prospective arbitrators, monitoring 
their competency and performance, or defining the relationship and obligations of arbitrators and 
program administrators to the attorney disciplinary process. Furthermore, the fee arbitration 
program should prepare and distribute informational brochures and instructional manuals for the 
benefit of disputants and arbitrators; prepare and revise standard forms; perform ongoing surveys 
of arbitration participants; prepare annual reports; and formulate and implement policies in 
collaboration with local administrators. In order for the program to meet these demands and 
achieve its full potential, the court system will have to devote resources and staff commensurate 
with the program’s growing size and importance. Id. at 26-27. 
[17] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136, Part 136 Rules of the Chief Administrator of the 
Courts (1999). For purposes of this guide, the term “matrimonial lawyer” means an attorney in a 
matrimonial action, as defined in N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, §136. 
[18] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1400.3 (2001); see infra Appendix A for the required 
contents of the written retainer agreement. 
[19] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1400.2 (2001). See also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 
22, § 1200.11(f) (2001); Bar Association Ethical Opinions 1997 WL 1068488 (Op. 685, N.Y. St. 
Bar. Assn. Comm. Prof. Eth. 1997) (prospective clients in matrimonial matters must be provided 
with the Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities at consultations that occur before the 
attorney has agreed to undertake the representation). 
[20] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22 § 1400.2 (2001). The complete Statement of Client’s 
Rights and Responsibilities that must be given to the prospective client is set forth in Appendix 
B, infra. 
[21] Philips v. Philips, 178 Misc. 2d 159, 678 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. Nass. County 1998) 
(attorney was precluded from recovering fees where he failed to present retainer agreement and 
statement of client’s rights directly to client, and presentation to brother was insufficient 
notwithstanding brother had power of attorney for client); Rabinowitz v. Cousins, 219 A.D.2d 
487 (1st Dep’t 1995) (complaint dismissed for failure to file retainer statement); Marshall v. 
Chitayat, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 6, 2000 at 27, col. 6; K.E.C. v. C.A.C., 173 Misc. 2d 592, 661 N.Y.S.2d 
715 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997) (attorneys were precluded from obtaining payment of their 
fees out of money paid by husband to wife where attorneys did not notify wife of her right to 
request arbitration of fee dispute (N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.5), did not prove 
existence of retainer agreement signed by wife (CLS Code of Prof. Resp. DR 2-106(C)(2)(B); 
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1200.11(c)(2)(ii)) (2001)) and did not show that wife ever 
received Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities (N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 
§1400.2, 1200.47 (2001))). 
[22] Cf. Mueller v. Pacicca, 179 Misc. 2d 392, 684 N.Y.S.2d 753 (City Ct. White Plains, 1998) 
(where client never signed retainer agreement, attorney was not entitled to recover any legal fees 
and had to refund fees previously collected); Bill Alden, Failure to Follow Matrimonial Rules 
Costs Lawyer Her Fee, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1998 (commenting on Mueller v. Pacicca). But cf. 
Markard v. Markard, infra note 30 and text at infra notes 29-34. 
[23] N.Y. State Bar. Ass’n. Comm. Prof. Ethics, supra note 19 (hereinafter N.Y. 685). 
[24] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1200.11(c)(2)(ii) (2001); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & 
Regs. 22, § 1400.3 (2001). 
[25] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1400.3 (2001). 
[26] Philips v. Philips, 178 Misc. 2d 159 at 161, 678 N.Y.S.2d 244 at 245 (Sup. Ct. Nass. County 
1998) (failure to timely file the retainer agreement precludes right to collect fee). 
[27] “The Code [of Professional Responsibility] effectively precludes an attorney from collecting 
any fee where there is no written retainer in any case where one is required under the 
matrimonial rules, and certainly, such a fee could not be reasonable if it were one expressly 
precluded by court rule” McMahon v. Evans, 169 Misc. 2d 509, 515, 645 N.Y.S.2d 753, 758 
(Sup. Ct. Broome County 1996); Julien v. Machson, 245 A.D.2d 122, 666 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 
(1st Dep’t 1997) (failure of attorney to file a copy of written retainer agreement with the court, 
along with other failures to comply with the matrimonial rules precluded attorney from 
recovering any fee); see also, Forbes v. Forbes, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1997 at 26, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. County 1997); Mueller v. Pacicca, 179 Misc. 2d 392, 684 N.Y.S.2d 753 (City Ct. White 
Plains, 1998); CPLR § 237, Supp. Practice Commentaries, at 375. 
[28] Flanagan v. Flanagan, 175 Misc. 2d 160, 668 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. NY County 1997) 
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, §1200.11(c)(2)(ii) (2001) and N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 
22, § 1400.3 (2001), were designed to eliminate long-standing abuses pertaining to the retention 
of counsel in matrimonial cases, and their purpose supports the conclusion that they must be read 
to prevent collection of fees in matrimonial actions where there has been a failure to fully 
comply with § 1400.3 (which regulates the contents of a retainer agreement; reargued and 
reversed, order of May 13, 1998 which granted attorney’s fee request; modified, 267 A.D.2d 80, 
699 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep’t 1999) (although the respondent-attorney did not fully comply with 
the mandates of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1400.2 (2001) and § 1400.3, which, 
respectively, require that counsel provide prospective clients with information as to their rights 
and responsibilities before entering into a retainer agreement and that specified provisions be 
included in retainer agreements, there was substantial compliance with those requirements and 
defendant waived her right to arbitration of the attorneys’ fees dispute; this, along with the fact 
that counsel rendered substantial services and achieved reasonably favorable results, entitled 
attorney to a reasonable fee; attorney had previously been awarded $41,000 in interim fees and 
an additional $29,655.30 upon reargument; modified and reduced to $11,905.30 because attorney 
failed to keep sufficiently detailed billing records and brought a frivolous motion which was 
included in his fee statement but for which he was not entitled to a fee)). 
[29] Mueller v. Pacicca, 179 Misc. 2d 392, 684 N.Y.S.2d 753 (City Ct. White Plains, 1998) 
(where client never signed retainer agreement, attorney was not entitled to recover legal fees at 
all, and had to refund fees previously collected); Brenda S. Levinson, Courts Put Teeth Into 
Matrimonial Rules – Avoid Getting Bitten, unpublished report on file with author, circa 2000 
(relating experience as one of a panel of three matrimonial fee arbitrators which held that in a 
case where the attorney had failed to provide client with a signed written retainer agreement at 
the outset of the representation, even though attorney did extensive work in an expedient and 
commendable manner and the client agreed that the hours charged had been expended on the 
client’s behalf and the work stated to have been performed was performed, the attorney was not 
entitled to collect any fee and had to refund fees already collected). 
[30] Markard v. Markard, 263 A.D.2d 470, 692 N.Y.S.2d 733 (2d Dep’t 1999) (client discharged 
attorney after paying a $10,000 retainer fee and though attorney agreed to refund the minimal 
unused portion thereof, client sought return of entire fee paid claiming that a provision in the 
retainer agreement waiving itemized billing contravened the strict requirements of the 
matrimonial rules [N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1400.3 (2001)]; denial of request for 
refund of all of the retainer fee upheld because discharge was by consent, not for just cause, and 
the cases holding that the matrimonial rules preclude the collection of fees where the retainer 
provisions are not complied with are distinguishable because they concern attorneys seeking to 
compel clients to pay for services rendered but not paid for and not for retainer fees already 
paid). 
[31] Id. at 734. 
[32] See infra note 62. 
[33] See infra note 64. 
[34]For a discussion of the client discharge rule, see generally, Lester Brickman and Lawrence 
Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract 
Law, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 149, 149 (1988) (hereinafter Nonrefundable Retainers); Lester 
Brickman and Lawrence Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 North Carolina L. 
Rev 1 (1993) (hereinafter Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited). 
[35] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.1. 
[36] N.Y. 685, supra note 19. 
[37] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.4(a). Disputes involving a sum less than $3,000 
shall be submitted to one attorney arbitrator. § 136.3(c). Disputes involving a sum of $3,000 or 
more shall be submitted to a panel of three arbitrators, consisting of one attorney, one layperson, 
and a third panel member, selected at random, who is either an attorney or layperson. The chair 
shall be an attorney, who shall be selected by the panel members if more than one attorney is on 
the panel. § 136.3(d). 
[38] See infra Appendix D, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.5(a). A client may also 
consent to an attorney’s request to submit the fee dispute to arbitration. Id. at §136.5(d). 
Additionally, an attorney’s refusal or failure to submit to the arbitration process shall subject him 
to disciplinary action. Id. at § 136.10. 
[39] Julien v. Machson, 245 A.D.2d 122, 666 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1st Dep’t. 1997) (failure of counsel 
to provide client with notice of right to arbitrate fee dispute as well as failure to meet other 
requirements of the Matrimonial Rules precluded recovery of legal fees); L.H. v. V.W., 171 
Misc. 2d 120, 653 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1996) (same); Lewis & Merritt, L.L.P. 
v. Smith, 170 Misc. 2d 192, 650 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (matrimonial client’s silence and 
failure to object to billings sent by attorney for services rendered could not be construed as 
implied assent where it equally suggested lack of assent, and thus client was entitled to dismissal 
of complaint in action to recover attorney’s fee where he was not given requisite notice of his 
right to arbitration under CLS Sup. Ct. R. § 136.5); see also, infranote 82; Marshall v. Chitayat, 
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 6, 2000, at 27, col. 6 (failure to notify client of right to elect arbitration to resolve 
a fee dispute as well as failure to comply with other provisions of the Matrimonial Rules 
including failure to file an appropriate retainer agreement with the court, failure to provide client 
with written itemized bills every 60 days, and once the retainer fee was earned, every 30 days, 
warrants dismissal of action filed by attorney for fees, with prejudice); Moraitis v. 
Moraitis, infra note 57 
[40] Miller v. Corbett, 177 Misc. 2d 266, 676 N.Y.S.2d 770 (City Ct. Yonkers, 1998) (“[b]ecause 
of the salutary and remedial nature of the fee arbitration rule, it must be interpreted 
expansively,” id. at 773); Paikin v. Tsirelman, 266 A.D.2d 136, 699 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1st Dep’t 
1999) (failure of client to object to fees billed by matrimonial lawyer does not excuse lawyer 
from having to provide notice of the right to arbitration before bringing suit for unpaid fees; to 
hold otherwise would allow circumventing the notice and pleading requirements of N.Y. Comp. 
Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.5 and would “effectively eviscerate the fee arbitration rules 
governing domestic relations matters.”). But see Scordio v. Scordio, 270 A.D.2d 328, 705 
N.Y.S.2d 58 (2d Dep’t 2000) (discharged attorney sought charging lien against wife and wife 
sought repayment of all fees previously paid to that attorney; held, attorney entitled to quantum 
meruit and because former client had not disputed the reasonableness of the fees charged, the 
attorney was not required to send her a notice informing her of her right to subject the fees to 
arbitration. “We decline to follow the rule adopted by the Appellate Division, First Department, 
[in Paikin v. Tsirelmen] which obligates an attorney to send such a notice even in the absence of 
any fee disagreement with a client. . . .” id. at 59). 
[41] See supra notes 21 and 26. 
[42] K.E.C. v. C.A.C., 173 Misc. 2d 592, 661 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997). 
[43] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.5(b). 
[44] Id. at § 136.5(d). 
[45] See generally 1 WARREN’S WEED N.Y. REAL PROPERTY “ATTORNEYS AT LAW” 
§ 6 (1992). 
[46] In re Weitling, 266 N.Y. 184, 194 N.E. 401 (1935) (attorney cannot be compelled to 
surrender papers in his possession before payment or adequate provision for compensation); 
Artim v. Artim, 109 A.D.2d. 811, 486 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep’t 1985) (client must satisfy or 
adequately secure lien before turnover of client papers will be ordered); Tri-Ex Enters. v. 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 583 F.Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (retaining lien’s purpose is to 
prevent client from refusing to pay charges justly due); Petrillo v. Petrillo, 87 A.D.2d 607, 448 
N.Y.S.2d 404 (2d Dep’t 1985) (reversing order to deliver papers and ordering hearing to ensure 
that payments received by attorney amount to value of legal services 
rendered). See generally Note, Attorney’s Retaining Lien Over Former Client’s Papers, 65 
Colum. L. Rev. 296 (1965). 
[47] People v. Keeffe, 50 N.Y.2d 149, 428 N.Y.S.2d 446, 405 N.E.2d 1012 (1980) (at common 
law, a lien attached to the judgment and the proceeds of the judgment); In re Estate of Gutchess, 
90 A.D.2d 663, 456 N.Y.S.2d 949 (3d Dep’t 1982); In re County of Nassau, 80 A.D.2d 613, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep’t 1981) (award fixing charging lien reduced because original award 
included fees for services rendered in other proceedings); Kaplan v. Reuss, 113 A.D.2d 184, 495 
N.Y.S.2d 404 (2d Dep’t 1985) (where firm commenced action for client and client ultimately 
negotiated settlement, firm had charging lien on proceeds of settlement), aff’d, 68 N.Y.2d 693, 
506 N.Y.S.2d 304, 497 N.E.2d 671 (1986). The two liens are distinct. White v. White, 107 Misc. 
2d 551, 435 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981) (citingIn re Heinsheimer, 214 N.Y. 
361, 108 N.E. 636 (1915)). For example, an attorney who has instituted an action on behalf of a 
plaintiff and who is discharged without cause may impose a common law retaining lien on 
papers in the attorney’s possession and a statutory charging lien on the cause of action. 
[48] N.Y. Jud. Law §§ 475, 475-a (2001). Although the common law charging lien continues to 
exist, attorneys virtually always rely on the expanded statutory charging lien. In re Sebring, 238 
A.D.281, 264 N.Y.S. 379 (4th Dep’t 1933) (acknowledging that the statutory lien had virtually 
taken the place of the common law charging lien). 
[49] Artim, 109 A.D.2d 811. 
[50] Black letter law has generally regarded the retaining lien as authorizing attorneys to retain 
client money to compel payment of outstanding fees. See, e.g., People v. Keeffe, 50 N.Y.2d 149, 
155, 428 N.Y.S.2d 446, 449, 405 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (1980) (the retaining lien entitles attorney 
to withhold all papers, securities or money belonging to client until amount of fee is fixed and 
paid). But courts, in some instances, have exhibited such reluctance to allow attorneys to assert 
retaining liens when money is involved, that it has become the virtual equivalent of all-
encompassing exceptions to the general rule. Most notably, funds taken for a special purpose or 
as trustee are not subject to the attorney’s retaining lien. See, e.g., Marsano v. State Bank of 
Albany, 27 A.D.2d 411, 279 N.Y.S.2d 817 (3d Dep’t 1967),appeal dismissed, 23 N.Y.2d 1018, 
299 N.Y.S.2d 458, 247 N.E.2d 286 (1969). However, in at least one contemporary case, the 
court, appearing somewhat disdainful of the client’s plea of hardship, has upheld an attorney’s 
retaining lien on client funds. In re Estate of Dinger, 118 Misc. 2d 781, 461 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sur. 
Ct. Richmond County 1983) (surrogate sustained attorney’s retaining lien on $158,000 tax 
certiorari check, representing only part of the refund payable to executrix). 
[51] Bowling Green Savs. Bank v. Todd, 52 N.Y. 489 (1873); see also Chlost v. Chlost, 75 
A.D.2d 527, 426 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1st Dep’t 1980) (attorney had retaining lien on client files if 
client owes any sum for services or disbursements); cf. supra note 50. 
[52] Manfred & Sons, Inc. v. Mortillaro, 69 A.D.2d 1019, 416 N.Y.S.2d 156 (4th Dep’t 1979). 
[53] Yaron v. Yaron, 58 A.D.2d 752, 396 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1st Dep’t 1977) (ordering summary 
determination of lien and conditioning turnover upon payment or posting of security). The lien 
secures the balance due for all prior legal services rendered for which the attorney has not yet 
been compensated, whether pertaining to the attached property or not. First Nat’l Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Hyman Novic Realty Corp., 72 A.D.2d 858, 421 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep’t 1979) (common-
law retaining lien is lien for entire balance of account). Thus, an attorney may withhold papers or 
money unrelated to matters giving rise to the general balance due. Kaplan v. Reuss, 113 A.D.2d 
184, 495 N.Y.S.2d 404 (2d Dep’t 1985) (a retaining lien may be used to satisfy any amount due 
the attorney for legal services rendered with respect to any matter), aff’d, 68 N.Y.2d 693, 506 
N.Y.S.2d 304, 497 N.E.2d 671 (1986). 
[54] In re Makames, 238 A.D. 534, 537, 265 N.Y.S. 515, 519 (4th Dep’t 1933) (“[w]here 
pressing necessity exists” the court’s “power to substitute adequate security for a retaining lien is 
derived from the inherent right which the court has. . . to compel an attorney to act fairly and to 
deal equitably with his client.”) New York courts have also compelled an attorney to turn over 
client property with other security being substituted. Manfred & Sons, Inc. v. Mortillaro, 69 
A.D.2d 1019, 416 N.Y.S.2d 156 (4th Dep’t 1979) (affirming order to turn over documents to 
client but remanding for purpose of fixing appropriate security). 
[55] Katsaros v. Katsaros, 152 A.D.2d 539, 543 N.Y.S.2d 478 (2d Dep’t 1989); Pekoe v. Pekoe, 
101 A.D.2d 813, 475 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep’t 1984) (in light of defendant’s allegations of 
indigence, it would be inequitable to permit attorney to retain file pending payment; attorney 
may have hearing to determine compensation presently, but payment is deferred until conclusion 
of action); Rosen v. Rosen, 97 A.D.2d 837, 468 N.Y.S.2d 723 (2d Dep’t 1983) (granting former 
counsel a charging lien on any proceeds to be received upon resolution of the action, based on 
substituted counsels’ needs of papers to prepare case for trial and uncontroverted allegations of 
indigence); cf. Pileggi v. Pileggi, 127 A.D.2d 751, 512 N.Y.S2d 143 (2d Dep’t 1987) (reversing 
lower court’s denial of a retaining lien where there were allegations that incoming attorney had 
been paid retainer and client did not submit an affidavit of indigence). 
[56] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1200.11(e) (2001). 
[57] Moraitis v. Moraitis, 181 Misc. 2d 510, 694 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1999) 
(where spouse’s attorney in a matrimonial action withdraws with court’s approval because of 
nonpayment of fee and client’s new attorney seeks the file, counsel may not invoke a common 
law retaining lien if counsel has failed to provide client with written notice of the right to 
arbitrate the fee; although the Matrimonial Rules do not specifically abrogate an attorney’s claim 
for a retaining or charging lien, that result is called for by Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility 
DR2-106(E), N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1200.11 (e) (2001)); see also Philips v. 
Philips, 178 Misc. 2d 159, 678 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1998); K.E.C. v. C.A.C., 
173 Misc. 2d 592, 661 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997) (discharged attorney denied 
a charging lien because of his failure to comply with the matrimonial rules). 
[58] Mehler v. Mehler, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8, 1999, at 28, col. 5; Stellato v. Stellato, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30 
1996, at 29, col. 4 (noncompliance with Part 1400 of the Matrimonial Rules does not abrogate 
counsel’s common-law retaining lien; though the original Matrimonial Rules contained a 
provision abrogating the retaining lien in matrimonial matters, following a comment period, the 
proposed provision was withdrawn and not included in the final version of Part 1400. Against 
this background, there is no basis for concluding that Part 1400 as adopted abrogated the 
retaining lien by implication). See also, Scordio v. Scordio, 270 A.D.2d 328, 705 N.Y.S.2d 58 
(2d Dep’t 2000). 
[59] The Statement of Clients Rights and Responsibilities provides that the written retainer 
agreement “must specify under what circumstances . . . [the] attorney [can withdraw] for 
nonpayment of legal fees. If an action or proceeding is pending, the Court may give your 
attorney a “charging lien,” which entitles your attorney to payment for services already rendered 
at the end of the case out of the proceeds of the final order on judgment.” Appendix B. As 
drafted, however, it is unclear how the provision allowing for a charging lien meshes with the 
right to seek arbitration. Moreover, it has been suggested that since the charging lien has been 
created by statute, supra note 48, then it may not be abrogated by court rule. SeeJoel R. 
Brandes, Fee Dispute Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 2000, at 3, col. 3. 
[60] It is conceivable, even following the Mehler and Stellato courts’ rulings, that the client’s 
right to such arbitration under the Matrimonial Rules can still be preserved. Thus, if the client 
pays the fee of the discharged attorney in order to obtain his files, the client can then seek 
arbitration with regard to the fee paid. See text, supra accompanying notes 40-42. However, this 
seems an arduous route and inconsistent with the intent of the Matrimonial Rules. 
[61] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, §1200.11(c)(2)(i) (2001); Weinstein v. Barnett, 219 
A.D.2d 77, 640 N.Y. S.2d 103 (1st Dep’t 1996). “It should be noted that prior to the codification 
of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, §1400 (2001) et. seq., bar associations viewed it as 
ethically improper for an attorney to enter into any form of contingent fee arrangement in any 
aspect of a matrimonial matter, except where the representation was to collect alimony or child 
support payments already due and owing the party.” Daniel Buoniconti, Deborah B. Kahn & 
Stephanie E. Kupferman, Legal Malpractice: Techniques to Avoid Liability Escaping Ethical 
Enigmas and Fleeing Family Law Foibles: Malpractice Avoidance for the Matrimonial 
Practitioner, 608 Prac. L. Inst. 633 (1999). As N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, 
§1200.11(c)(2)(i) [DR2-106 (c)(2)(i)] is drafted, the exception for past due alimony or child 
support does not appear preserved. It is likely, however, that courts will still continue to allow 
the exception for the same reason that the exception was created. 
[62] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, §1200.11(c)(2)(ii) (2001); In re Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d 
465, 611 N.Y.S.2d 465, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (1994) (holding that nonrefundable fee retainer 
agreement is a per se violation of public policy and an attorney’s obligations under the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and that an attorney must refund unearned fees upon his or her 
discharge). See generally, Nonrefundable Retainers, supra note 34; Nonrefundable Retainers 
Revisited, supra note 34. However, § 1400.4 allows an attorney to enter into a “minimum fee” 
arrangement with a client that provides for the payment of a specific amount below which the fee 
will not fall based upon the handling of the case to its conclusion. For a minimum fee to be valid, 
however, the work contracted for must have been completed. If the lawyer is terminated before 
completion, then any minimum fee set in the contract is unenforceable because otherwise it 
would amount to a nonrefundable retainer and the attorney is instead entitled to the reasonable 
value of her services. See Letter from Lester Brickman and Lawrence A. Cunningham to Michael 
Colodner, Office of Court Administration, Sept. 8, 1993, and accompanying Memorandum of 
same date, commending the Proposed Matrimonial Rules’ prohibition of nonrefundable retainers 
but pointing out that allowing the use of a “minimum fee” defined as “a specific amount the 
client agrees to pay counsel if the latter is able to obtain a settlement in substantial accord with 
specified terms within a specified time period” [Report, supra note 9, at 18, note 39], would have 
the effect of “gut[t]ing] the nonrefundable retainer prohibition.” Letter, id. at 2. In response 
thereto, the proposed rules were changed to define a minimum fee as a fee “that provides for the 
payment of a specific amount below which the fee will not fall based upon handling of the case 
to its conclusion.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1400.4 (2001). 
[63] For a discussion of “without cause,” see Lester Brickman, Setting The Fee When The Client 
Discharges a Contingent Fee Attorney, 41 Emory L. Rev. 367, 393-97 (1992). 
[64] Martin v. Camp, 161 A.D. 610, 146 N.Y.S. 1041, 1914 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5456 
(1914). See infraParts V and VI, for further discussion of quantum meruit. 
[65] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 1400.5 (2001); Id. at § 1200.11. 
[66] See infra Part III.B. 
[67] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.6 (b). 
[68] Id. 
[69] Id. at §136.6(a). 
[70] Id. at §136.6(b). 
[71] Id. 
[72] Jacobson v. Sassower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 993, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381, 489 N.E.2d 1283 (1985). 
[73] Id. at 993, quoting from Smitas v. Rickett, 102 A.D.2d 928, 929, 477, N.Y.S.2d 752 (1984). 
[74] “By preponderance of evidence is meant that the superior weight of evidence upon the 
issues involved, which, while not enough to wholly free the mind from a reasonable doubt, is yet 
sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue, rather than to the 
other.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1201 (7th ed. 1999). 
[75] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, §136.6(b). 
[76] Id. 
[77] See Matter of McNamee, Lochner, Titus & Williams, 700 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 n.1 (3d Dep’t 
1999). 
[78] See supra Part II. 
[79] See Rosenman, 93 A.D.2d 745 (1983); Glazer v. Falberg, 85 A.D.2d 502 (1st Dep’t 1981). 
[80] Shaw v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 68 N.Y.2d 172 (1986); see also Jacobson v. 
Sassower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 993, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381, 489 N.E.2d 1283 (1985) (“courts pay 
particular attention to fee arrangements between attorneys and their clients.”). 
[81] See Rosenman Colin Freund Lewis & Cohen v. Neuman, 93 A.D.2d 745 (1st Dep’t 1983). 
In this case, where the matrimonial lawyer sought summary judgment in an action for almost 
$9000, the balance due of attorney fees after almost $12,000 had previously been paid, on the 
basis of an account stated and for work, labor, and services. The client had meager income, and 
claimed that he had not agreed to pay $40 per hour for paralegal charges, and complained that 
the law firm’s expenses were in the runaway stage. The court recognized an exception to the 
account stated rule, finding that the fee arrangement between plaintiff and defendant required 
special scrutiny; hence summary judgment would be denied. Levitz Trossman Mayerson & Zorn 
v. Davis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1992, at 27, col. 7 (Civil Ct. N.Y.). See generally Barney Butler, 
Recovering Fees from a Client: Clients’ Defenses to Account Stated Actions, 25 J. Legal Prof. 
27 (2001). 
[82] Lewis & Merritt v. Smith, 170 Misc. 2d 192, 650 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County. 
1996). 
[P]laintiff [attorney] would have this court interpret the common-law principles of account stated 
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357 (3d Dep’t 1997). 
[85] See Matter of McNamee, Lochne, Titus & Williams, 700 N.Y.S.2d 525 (3d Dep’t 1999). 
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(1994) (citations omitted). See also Cohen v. Ryan, 34 A.D.2d 789, 790, 311 N.Y.S.2d 644 (2d 
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1999) (respondent’s $22,000 fee in this “fairly simple” matrimonial action was clearly excessive 
where the “subject divorce raised no compelling legal issues … parties’ marriage was of short 
duration (less than three years) and produced no children; … [there were] no custody, visitation 
or child support issues … neither spouse was claiming spousal maintenance … [and there was] 
virtually no marital property to be distributed.”). Theroux v. Theroux, 145 A.D.2d 625, 536 
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extension of the quantum meruit rule from the terminated contingency fee contract to the hourly 
rate contract misapplies Martin v. Camp, and is unsustainable on grounds of policy or 
logic. See Lester Brickman, Setting The Fee When The Client Discharges A Contingency Fee 
Attorney, 41 Emory l. Rev. 367 (1992). 
[147] See supra Part V. 
[148] See Finkelstein v. Kins, 124 A.D.2d 92, 511 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (1st Dep’t 1987) (where 
the attorney is discharged without cause, the retainer agreement is relevant in determining the fee 
to which the attorney is entitled but it is not dispositive); Wald v. Wald, 170 A.D.2d 669, 567 
N.Y.S.2d 89 (2d Dep’t 1991). 
[149] Brickman, supra note 146, at 393-397. 
[150] To help avoid potential malpractice claims, attorneys should seek to educate the client on 
divorce procedures. See Kochalka, supra note 95. “Clients often will complain that “nothing is 
happening” with their case, with the implication that their attorney is negligent. This criticism 
often is the result of not understanding the process. … Expectations regarding fee arrangements, 
despite retainers and retainer agreements, are still sometimes unclear, with the lack of client 
understanding resulting in potential administrative and malpractice complaints.” 
[151] R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 1.1 (4th ed. 1996) (an attorney’s negligence 
will naturally “reduce the value of the services, and consequently the amount of compensation to 
be awarded.”). 
[152] See Koppelman v. Liddle, 246 A.D.2d 365, 668 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1st Dep’t 1998) (as a general 
rule, when a client does not prevail in an action with counsel for the value of professional 
services, a subsequent action for malpractice is barred); Altamore v. Friedman, 193 A.D.2d 240, 
245, 602 N.Y.S.2d 894, 897 (App. Div. 1993)(citations omitted)(“The question of whether to 
accord preclusive effect to a prior determination depends generally on a number of factors that 
we shall consider, including the identity of issues, the fullness and fairness of the parties’ 
opportunity to litigate the issue at bar, the realities of the arbitral proceedings, including the 
incentive to proceed to arbitration, and actual scope of the arbitration, as well as the presence and 
participation of counsel, the foreseeability of future litigation, the extent to which a matter was 
necessarily or implicitly decided in the arbitral forum (even if not actually litigated), the 
likelihood of inconsistent results, and the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine 
witnesses.” There are contrary decisions in other states. See, e.g., Weisman v. Schiller, Ducanto 
& Fleck, 733 N.E.2d 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (even though the client raised malpractice as an 
affirmative defense in a fee petition hearing, she was not later barred from bringing an action for 
damages arising from that malpractice because the fee petition proceeding does not afford the 
client an opportunity to recover damages in excess of the fees sought and extinguishes her right 
to a trial by jury.). 
[153] Altamore, 193 A.D.2d at 245-46, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 897; Iannochino v. Rodolakis, 242 F.3d 
36, 47 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding a subsequent malpractice suit was barred by res judicata from a 
fee claim arising in bankruptcy proceedings; the court explained, “[a] bankruptcy court therefore 
makes an implied ‘finding of quality and value’ in the professional services provided to the 
[clients] during the bankruptcy. Likewise, the [clients’] malpractice claim entails the same 
concern, as their allegations of malpractice arise from the defendants’ legal advice relating to the 
bankruptcy.” [Citations omitted]). See also Siegel v. Werner & Zaroff, P.C., 704 N.Y.S.2d 570 
(App. Div. 2000) (client, who discharged her original attorneys, was barred from bringing a 
malpractice suit to extinguish the charging lien against her personal injury judgment because in 
dividing the judgment between the original attorneys and the subsequent attorneys, the court had 
impliedly decided the issue of malpractice). 
[154] Altamore, 193 A.D.2d at 247, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 898. 
[155] Id. (citations omitted); cf. Simao v. Green & Seifter, 213 A.D.2d 1018, 625 N.Y.S2d 975 
(4th Dep’t 1995) (the entry of a judgment in favor of attorney against the client in a prior action 
to recover fees for legal services bars a malpractice action regarding those same legal services). 
[156] The jurisdictional scope of the domestic relations fee arbitration program is unclear. Under 
Part 136, theAdministrative Judge has discretion to “decline to accept or continue to arbitrate a 
dispute in which substantial legal questions are raised in addition to the basic fee dispute.” N.Y. 
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.4(b) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the rules provide that the 
“burden of proof shall be on the attorney to prove the reasonableness of the fee by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” See id. at § 136.6(b). Part 136 does not set forth any standards 
or guidance for ascertaining what is a substantial legal question or assessing the reasonableness 
of attorney’s fees. 
Arbitrators in the program are instructed during training that they are to disregard quality of 
representation issues in assessing the reasonableness of the fee. However, it is extremely difficult 
in practice to achieve a clear dichotomy between pure fee disputes, such as “bill padding,” and 
fee disputes that involve claims of attorney incompetence, neglect, delay, including charges that 
the fee was simply excessive in view of the result obtained. Statistical data compiled as part of 
this study reveals that in 70% of arbitrations the attorney’s fee was reduced, a possible indication 
that arbitrators are in fact considering the quality of representation when making their awards. 
Some arbitrators who responded to our survey stated that the clients were operating under the 
misapprehension that fee arbitration is a forum for evaluating attorney competence and ethical 
standards, but other arbitrators subscribe to another school of thought: “I don’t measure hours 
[times] rate alone, while I note that some arbitrators do. The dispute is often something other 
than the actual hours expended, but rather why the hours were spent and what was accomplished 
or arguably attempted.” The more typical observation from arbitrators was that “[t]he client did 
not understand that the proceeding was limited to the fee dispute. He wanted a ruling on the 
‘quality’ of representation he received and a reduction of the fee based on his perception that the 
attorney should have done more or better for him. It must be made clear to the client what the 
proceeding can and cannot accomplish.” Indeed, the written commentary from clients 
demonstrates that the jurisdictional scope of the fee arbitration scope is unclear: “I felt my 
attorney had been negligent, incompetent and unethical but those issues were not addressed. I 
was told the arbitrators were not there to determine if [my attorney] ‘did the work competently,’ 
just that ‘she did the work.’ Incredible! Horrible process, would not recommend it to anyone!” 
Clients should receive enough information to permit them to make an informed decision on 
whether to resolve their fee dispute through arbitration or the judicial process. The court system 
can assist clients in making informed decisions, without offering legal advice, by simply 
disclosing that arbitrators are not necessarily required to consider allegations of attorney 
incompetence, neglect, or misconduct. It is suggested that an expanded fee arbitration brochure, 
designed specifically for distribution to clients, include such a disclaimer as well as discussion of 
the program’s jurisdiction and the types of disputes that are both proper and improper for fee 
arbitration. Unless the court system informs clients at the outset of the program’s inability to hear 
certain types of fee disputes, the danger exists that clients will opt for fee arbitration when they 
would be better served by judicial proceedings wherein they could rely on their ability to invoke 
the protections afforded by applicable ethical rules and fiduciary law. 
As to what constitutes a substantial legal question, the court system should consider whether to 
adopt a more definitive policy concerning the program’s jurisdictional scope. At the present 
time, the critical determination whether to accept or continue to arbitrate a fee dispute is made by 
the Administrative Judges on a district by district basis and by the arbitrators during the 
arbitration hearing when such issues arise. As a result, there is no guarantee of statewide 
consistency. Other jurisdictions have recognized that fee disputes take on a multiplicity of 
variations and that it is difficult to arbitrate “pure” fee disputes only, while still addressing the 
needs and expectations of clients as consumers. The California arbitration statute, for instance, 
provides that arbitrators must consider claims of malpractice, but only as they relate to the value 
of services received, and New Jersey authorizes arbitrators to consider the quality of legal 
services when judging the reasonableness of the fee. Report, supra note 14, at 27-30 (footnote 
omitted). 
[157] See, e.g., Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys’ Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 
SMU L. Rev. 2005, 2049 (1993) (hereinafter Rau, ADR) (it would be “unrealistic to treat a 
client’s decision to seek fee relief in arbitration as somehow amounting to a ‘waiver’ or 
‘abandonment’ of the right to bring a malpractice action – and abusive to subject even an 
informed client, acting in full understanding of the consequences, to an irrevocable choice 
between the advantages of fee arbitration and the ability to press a malpractice claim.”). 
[158] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 136.4 (b) (“The Administrative Judge may decline to 
accept or continue to arbitrate a dispute is which substantial legal questions are raised in addition 
to the basic fee dispute. . .”). 
[159] 2 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 14.1 at 229 (4th ed. 1995). 
[160] L. Brickman and L. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, supra note 34, at 6 
n. 21 (1993); see also In re Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d 465, 472, 611 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467, 633 N.E.2d 
1069, 1071 (1994) (“The duty to deal fairly, honestly and with undivided loyalty superimposes 
onto the attorney-client relationship a set of special and unique duties, including maintaining 
confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, operating competently, safeguarding client 
property and honoring the client’s interests over the lawyer’s.”). 
[161] 1 G. Hazard, Jr. & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct § 1.5: 108 (2d ed. Supp. 1998); see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 401 
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 240 (Tex. 1999). 
[162] Restatment (Third) Of The Law Governing Lawyers § 49 (Proposed Final Draft 1996). 
[163] See generally L. Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 277 (1990); see also Rau, supra note 157. 
[164] The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 49 (Proposed Final Draft, 1996) 
provides that to subject the attorney to fee forfeiture, the lawyer’s conduct must be both a “clear” 
and a “serious” violation of a duty. A clear violation is described as conduct that “a reasonable 
lawyer, knowing the relevant facts and law reasonably accessible to the lawyer, would have 
known [to be] wrongful.” The Restatement further provides: 
[in] determining whether and to what extent forfeiture is appropriate, relevant considerations 
include the gravity and timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the 
lawyer’s work for the client, and the adequacy of other remedies. 
Id. 
[165] These are set forth in Part 1200 of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, §1200 (2001). 
[166] For an analysis of the interrelatedness of fiduciary obligation and ethical rules, see Lester 
Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without The Prince of 
Denmark?, 37 Ucla L. Rev. 29, 44-45 note 65 (1989). 
[167] N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 691.6. 
[168] Condren v. Grace, 783 F. Supp. 178, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
[169] N.Y. Jud. Law § 90 (2) (McKinney 1983). 
[170] Each Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court has enacted rules creating 
Departmental Disciplinary Committees that investigate and prosecute complaints of professional 
misconduct. See, e.g.,N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 22, § 603.4, 691.4 (these are the rules of the 
First and Second Appellate Divisions, respectively). See also D. Appel, Attorney Disbarment 
Proceedings and The Standard of Proof, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 275 (1995). 
[171] C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 9.6, at 555. See also Rau, ADR, supra note 157, at 
2043-44. 
For example, many disputes between attorneys and clients nominally arise because a client is 
demanding the return of a fee paid. On this basis, a grievance committee saddled with an 
excessive caseload may be eager to shunt the dispute to the Bar’s fee arbitration committee as a 
fee dispute – even though it may also appear that the representation of the client had been less 
than devoted because of a conflict of interest, that the attorney is refusing to account for trust 
funds that he is holding on the client’s behalf, that the attorney had promised services that he did 
not in fact perform, or that his past conduct reveals many similar instances of client overreaching 
or billing abuse. In a significant category of cases, then, a contractual dispute over the fee may be 
only the tip of the iceberg, with other issues of vital public concern lurking just beneath the 
surface. There are a number of related points here: The resolution of “fee disputes” by arbitration 
may fail to address the public interest in law enforcement, by failing even to address related 
issues of professional misconduct. When individual disputes are resolved at different times by 
different panels of arbitrators,  recurrent patterns of abuse may not be detected or sanctioned. 
And if the diversion of fee disputes to alternative processes allows attorneys to avoid costs (such 
as adverse publicity and the stigma of disciplinary proceedings) that they would otherwise incur 
in an official forum, the resulting level of deterrence of misconduct may well be inadequate. 
Any scheme for the mandatory arbitration of fee disputes should then at the very least be part of 
an overall system – a system in which the resolution of a particular attorney-client dispute is 
connected with the disciplinary process through which professional conduct is scrutinized for 
ethical violations. “Loops” between the two can be designed to ensure that the law enforcement 
functions served by attorney discipline are not swept under the rug in the drive toward private 
settlement. Id. 
[172] Wheeler v. Scott, 777 P. 2d 394 (Okla. 1989) (“the proper determination of reasonable 
attorney fees requires a balancing and thorough consideration of the . . . [reasonable fee] factors. 
. . . Setting attorney fees would be a simple matter if numbers could be inserted mechanically 
into a universally valid formula. Unfortunately, this is not the case.”). Id. at 398. 
[173] See supra note 14. In order to be able to assess the operation of the program, it is essential 
that the kinds of analyses contained in the Report, including the actual results of fee arbitrations, 
be undertaken on a regular basis. The process would be facilitated by the development of a 
uniform reporting form that fee arbitrators would be asked to fill out that would include such 
information as the attorney’s hourly rate, the amount of time billed, the total fee, the amount in 
dispute, the result of the arbitration, the percentage denial of the fee (if any), the reason(s) for the 
denial (with a list of ten or so reasons and a check-off box for each reason), perhaps an allocation 
by percentage of the amount of any fee denied among the reasons set out for denial, whether the 
arbitrant is the monied or non-monied spouse (or whether both are monied), the amount of 
marital assets, and whether there was any issue of malpractice raised or breach of fiduciary 
obligation. 
 
 
